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A DIFFERENT AND MORE VIABLE THEORY
OF EQUAL PROTECTION
ARNOLD H. LoEwYt

The multitude of equal protection cases of the last decade has been
more than equaled by critical commentary upon them. This plethora
of analysis is invited if not ordained by the ambiguity inherent in the
term "equal protection." Obviously, not all unequal legislation is unconstitutional. Yet, as Professor Cox observed: "Once loosed, the idea
of Equality is not easily cabined."' The purpose of this article is to
suggest a general standard for the Court to apply in evaluating claims

regulaof unequal protection occasioned by a statute or administrative
2
tion treating one group less favorably than another.
Any general theory of equal protection (or for that matter any
clause of the Constitution) should be fairly attributable to the docu-

ment from which it comes-the Constitution.' Thus, the equal protection clause should not be used as a peg upon which to hang desired
social policy unless that policy is within the general purposes underly-

ing the adoption of the clause.4 In addition to being fairly attributable
t

Professor of Law, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; B.S. 1961, J.D. 1963,

Boston University; LL.M. 1964, Harvard University.
The concepts presented in this article have been developed over several years. During this
time I have been assisted by several law students whose contributions are gratefully acknowledged. I would like especially to thank Ms. Jacqueline Quick, currently a third year law student,
for her assistance in the preparation of this article. A word of thanks is also due the North
Carolina Law Center, which facilitated the completion of the article. Finally I would like to
thank several of my colleagues for their thoughts and advice, particularly Henry Brandis, whose
thorough editing undoubtedly reduced the workload of the Law Reviews editorial board.
1. Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term - Foreword-ConsttutionalAdjudicationandthe Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 91 (1966).
2. This article is concerned only with those cases in which it is clear that one group is being
treated less favorably than another, and the only question is whether the discrimination is justifiable. In recent years, many equal protection cases have involved questions of whether there is
discrimination at all, for instance, separate schools according to gender, Vorcheimer v. School
Dist., 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (mem.), performance tests for police officers that in fact exclude more
blacks than whites, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), exclusion of pregnancy from a state
disability insurance scheme, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), and, of course, racial segregation, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). These cases are beyond the scope of this
article.
3. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf-A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,
949 (1973).
4. Judges who have written on the subject seem more willing to misuse the clause in this
manner than are professors. See, e.g., Craven, Paeanto Pragmatism,50 N.C.L. REV. 977, 988-89
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to the Constitution, an ideal test should be susceptible to general application, or, in Professor Wechsler's words, it should announce a "neutral
principle."5 Before attempting to derive a general test from the Constitution, an examination of the concept of equal protection is in order.
The most significant characteristic of equal protection is that it focuses upon relative rather than absolute mistreatment. That is, a law
does not violate equal protection because it treats A unfairly in the
abstract. Rather, it can violate equal protection only if it treats A less
favorably than B. Thus, one claiming a denial of equal protection is
not saying to the state, "You cannot treat me this way because it is
unfair." Instead, he is saying, "You cannot treat me this way because
you treat B better." Therefore, when one's essential constitutional argument concerns abstract rather than relative unfairness, equal protection is an inappropriate basis for invalidating a statute. As basic as
this principle is, the courts have not always recognized it.
A good illustration is Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Murgia,6 which involved a law mandating retirement at age fifty from
the uniformed branch of the state police force. Officer Murgia argued
that the actual or potential physical deterioration of one who has
reached age fifty is not sufficient to mandate retirement. Therefore, he
contended that he was denied equal protection by the disparity in treatment accorded him as opposed to a younger officer. A moment's reflection, however, suggests that the nub of Murgia's argument had nothing
to do with the thirty or forty year old officers on the force. All parties
conceded that the younger officers could be treated differently from
older ones in regard to the intensity with which their physical fitness
was scrutinized. 7 Thus, the Court should not have been concerned with
(1972); Wright, Professor Bickel the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L.
REv. 769, 791-92 (1971). However, it is hard to justify life-tenured judges creating rights that are
not fairly implicit in the Constitution. Such action is unfortunately closely related to denying
rights that are protected by the Constitution. See Loewy, Abortive Reasons and Obscene Standards: A Comment on the Abortion and Obscenity Cases, 52 N.C.L. REv. 223 (1973). This is certainly not to suggest that the Constitution is static or that judges can be replaced by computers.
Limiting a constitutional provision, however, to the general purposes underlying its adoption
hardly mandates a static or mechanical approach.
5. Wechsler, Toward NeutralPrincoles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REv. I (1959).
6. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
7. For example, policemen under 40 were required to pass a physical examination only once
every two years, whereas those between 40 and 50 were required to pass a more intense physical
annually. Id. at 311.
It is clear that subjecting one group to more difficult means to obtain the same end as another
group can constitute a denial of equal protection. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
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the propriety of treating fifty year olds differently from younger officers-that alone is not unconstitutional.
The question that should have concerned the Court is the abstract
propriety of retiring a fifty year old officer, which is essentially a due
process question. Arguably no harm was done by the Court's misanalysis since it did consider the justifications that led to the mandatory
retirement law and concluded that they were reasonable. 8 Nevertheless, had the Court considered the case in due process terms, it would
have had to reconcile Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,9 in
which it held that due process forbids the automatic dismissal of school
teachers who are five months pregnant. Just as Ms. LaFleur successfully argued that some school teachers are capable of teaching beyond
five months of pregnancy, Officer Murgia could rightly contend that
some uniformed officers are able to continue to work after age fifty.
Although the cases are distinguishable, it would have been useful to
have the Court's evaluation of the validity of the distinctions.' 0
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,11 excessive emphasis upon
equal protection may have produced the wrong result. In that case, a
local zoning ordinance permitted only single-family dwellings; the ordinance defined a family as any number of related people, but no more
than two unrelated people living together in a single house. The litigation involved a six bedroom house that was rented to six unrelated college students in contravention of the ordinance. By a seven to one
vote, the Court upheld the ordinance.
8. "Since physical ability generally declines with age, mandatory retirement at 50 serves to
remove from police service those whose fitness for uniformed work presumptively has diminished
with age. This clearly is rationally related to the State's objective." 427 U.S. at 315.
9. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
10. Murgia can be distinguished from LaFleur on at least four grounds. (I) By denying a
physically capable pregnant school teacher the right to teach, the school board penalized the fundamental right of procreation. See generally Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). (2) Since
men cannot become pregnant, denying physically capable pregnant school teachers the right to
teach arguably discriminates against women. Put Gf Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)
(state disability program for private employees temporarily disabled from working held not violative of the equal protection clause even though it did not insure disability resulting from normal
pregnancy). (3) There is greater difficulty in knowing for certain when an apparently overaged
police officer is going to suffer a sudden attack than there is in regard to a teacher five months
pregnant. Also, there is greater public danger involved if the police officer does suffer an attack.
(4) Early retirement from the police force may be justified as a means of facilitating employment
opportunities and promotions for younger men. See Ackerman, The Conclusive Presumption
Shuffle, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 761, 799-800 (1977); cf. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975)
(congressional statutory scheme providing longer tenure period for female naval officers was justified as providing women officers with fair and equitable career advancement programs and did
not violate due process clause), discussed in textaccompanying notes 91-97 infra.
11. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
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An examination of the Court's opinion, which rejected the equal
protection challenge to the ordinance, is not very helpful, principally
because there is almost no analysis to examine.' z In Justice Marshall's
more useful dissent' 3 he finds that the ordinance impinged on the fundamental right of association, people related to one another were favored over those who were not, and there was no compelling need for
this distinction since large families could create the same population
density problems as large nonfamilies. Therefore, he concluded that
the ordinance violated the equal protection clause.
Marshall's analysis could be countered in the following manner.
Although both familial and nonfamilial people contribute to population density problems, they are not similarly situated. American society is built around the family, and caring for and taking in relatives is
an American custom that the Village of Belle Terre may have wished to
preserve.' 4 In order both to preserve this ancient custom and at least
somewhat to limit population density, it was necessary generally to
limit the size of a household while making an exception for homes occupied exclusively by members of the same family.
Although the Court did not specifically address Marshall's analysis, it probably feared adopting a rule that would prevent a state or
municipality from enacting a zoning ordinance favoring families. Yet,
had the Court analyzed the problem as one of free association rather
than equal protection, it could have invalidated the ordinance without
intimating that families could never be given favored treatment. Without regard to families, any law that limits associational rights certainly
should be no broader than is necessary for the effectuation of a legitimate state purpose.15 The interest of people in living in the same house
would seem to be within the ambit of the first amendment, especially
when the people involved are college students who may view their living arrangements as a better method of exchanging ideas than would
be available if they lived alone or with one roommate and were merely
able to visit their desired housemates.' 6 Because this first amendment
12. Mr. Justice Douglas wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 1. Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting, did not reach the merits of the controversy because in his view the case was moot. Id. at 10

(dissenting opinion).
13.

Id. at 12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

14. Cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (housing ordinance that limited
occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family and recognized only a few categories
of related individuals as a "family," and under which it was a crime for grandmother to have
grandsons living with her, violated due process).
15. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
16. Indeed, this aspect of associational freedom is substantially closer to the core of the first
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5

interest is more or less indirect, it presumably could be subordinated to
a reasonable density control ordinance. Belle Terre, however, limited
its residences to two unrelated persons per unit, which seems unreasonable when applied to a six bedroom house. Thus, the first amendment
claim of Boraas probably should have prevailed, and Belle Terre
should have been required to adopt legislation more precisely tailored
to meet its density control objective. 17 Yet, because of the Court's insis-

tence on treating Belle Terre as an equal protection case, it never came
to grips with the first amendment issues.
Injudicious use of equal protection theory not only has contributed

to the sustaining of apparently invalid statutes, but has led to the invalidation of other statutes on wholly specious grounds. For example, in
Eisenstadt v. Baird,'" a case that invalidated on equal protection
grounds a Massachusetts law precluding the distribution of contraceptive devices to unmarried people, the Court said: "Whatever the rights
of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be
the same for the unmarried and the married alike. If under Griswold 19

the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally im-

permissible." 2 The Court's logic would be impeccable if unmarried

people enjoyed the same constitutional (or perhaps even statutory)

right to engage in sexual intercourse that married people enjoy. However, the Court stopped short of so holding, and the right of a single

person to engage in sexual intercourse remains in doubt.2 'Assuming,
amendment's guarantee of free speech than the penumbral right protected in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
17. Examples would be limits of no more than one person (or if desired, one unrelated person) per bedroom, or no more than two cars per house.
18. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
19. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), held that a married person could not be
punished for using contraceptives while engaging in sexual intercourse with his or her spouse.
20. 405 U.S. at 453 (footnotes added).
21. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), a majority of the Justices indicated that
sex outside of marriage was not constitutionally protected-Justices Goldberg, Brennan, and
Chief Justice Warren, id. (concurring opinion), Justice Harlan, id. (concurring opinion) (incorporating by reference his dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 533 (1961)), and Justice White, id.
at 502 (concurring opinion). Of course Justices Black, id. at 507 (dissenting opinion), and Stewart, id.at 527 (dissenting opinion), did not even believe that married people had a constitutional
right to contraceptive devices. Cf.Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (summary affirmance of three-judge district court decision that statute making sodomy a crime not
unconstitutional as applied to consenting adults). But Gf Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding qualified constitutional right of a single woman to terminate her pregnancy). As recently as
June 9, 1977, the Court reiterated that it considers the question to be open. Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 691-96 n.17 (1977) (invalidating state law that prohibited distribution of
contraceptives to anyone under 16 years old).
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arguendo, that a single person does not have a right to engage in sexual
intercourse, the fallacy of the Court's analysis becomes apparent. A
married person needs a contraceptive device to prevent conception
while engaging in lawful, constitutionally protected activity. An unmarried person, on the other hand, does not need a contraceptive device unless he intends to engage in an unlawful activity. Surely there is
nothing invidious in drawing a distinction based on the legal ability to
receive a product between those who might have a lawful use for the
22
product and those who by definition cannot have a lawful use for it.
Therefore, whatever else may be wrong (be it constitutional defect or
uncommon silliness 23) with the Massachusetts anticontraceptive law, it
should not have been found violative of the equal protection clause.24
Murgia, Boraas and Baird all illustrate the Court's tendency to
overuse and thereby misuse the equal protection clause. One proposing
a new and comprehensive theory of equal protection should be cognizant of this phenomenon and aim to confine consideration of equal
protection to cases in which the problem really is one of invidious classification. While such a theory is not meant to return the equal protection clause to "the last resort of constitutional arguments, ' 25 it is
intended to stop employment of the clause as the automatic, and at
times exclusive, resort of the Justices.26
A second aspect of the equal protection clause that needs exploration prior to proposing a general test is the purpose underlying the
framers' adoption of the provision. Two points stand out with unusual
clarity: first, the principal concern of the framers was to eliminate invidious racial discrimination; 27 second, the equal protection clause, unlike the fifteenth amendment, is not limited to "race, color, or previous
condition of servitude." 28 As the late Professor Bickel said: "This cannot have been accidental. '29 Thus, it appears that the framers contemplated that racial discrimination might not be the only discrimination
forbidden by the equal protection clause. On the other hand, they
22. The fact that a married person also has a potential unlawful use for the product, ie.,
adultery, is immaterial.
23. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
24. Much of the Baird faulty reasoning was repeated in Zablocki v. Redhail, 98 S. Ct. 673
(1978). For an outstanding critique, see id. at 683-84 (Stewart, J., concurring).
25. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
26. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 98 S. Ct. 673, 683-84 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring).
27. See Bickel, The Original Understandingandthe Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1

(1955).
28. U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § 1.
29. Bickel, supra note 27, at 60.
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could not possibly have intended to invalidate all legislation that is in
any way unequal, since that would be tantamount to invalidating practically all legislation.
History being what it is (or what a good law firm can make it appear to be3°), it is doubtful that we can know exactly what the framers
had in mind. However, from what we do know (that the framers were
principally, but not exclusively, concerned with racial discrimination),
we can glean a principle that can be fairly attributed to the framers:
Laws that discriminate against racial minorities or groups sufficiently
analogous to racial minorities to warrant distrust of a judgment made
against them should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
Combining this principle with the need to limit equal protection to
those cases that actually involve invidious classification, the author
proposes the following test for ascertaining whether the equal protection clause has been violated:
When the group discriminated against is sufficiently analogous polit-

ically to a racial minority to distrust legislative or administrative action discriminating against it, no such action shall be constitutional
unless there is objective evidence of a nondiscriminatory purpose,
and that evidence is sufficient to render it probable that the discriminatory effect was merely an incidental adjunct to the legitimate, non-

discriminatory purpose.
The remainder of this article will discuss the differences between the
proposed test and the tests currently employed by the Supreme Court.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The proposed test is substantially in accord with the concept of
"suspect classifications." The test is couched in terms, however, that are
directly traceable to the purpose of the equal protection clause, thus
avoiding the criticism directed by Justices 31 and commentators 32 at the
"suspect classification" concept as unwarranted judicial activism when

employed outside the context of racial discrimination. To be sure, a
certain amount of activism is inevitable in the application of the test,
but this fact alone does not render a test unneutral or unprincipled.
30. See Kelly, Clio and the Court:.An Illicit LoveAffair, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 119, 155-57.
31. Justices Rehnquist and Harlan in particular have been critical of the concept. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777-86 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634, 655-57 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655-59

(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
32. See e.g., Bork, NeutralPrinciplesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
11-19 (1971).
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Although Justices should not be Platonic Guardians,33 neither should
they be mindless computers. The proposed test is a viable compromise
between these extremes.
An as yet unresolved ambiguity in the "suspect classification" test
is whether discrimination against the members of a politically powerful
group, for example, whites or men, is suspect. The proposed test takes
the position that such discrimination is generally permissible because
there is usually no reason to suspect a judgment made by a politically
powerful group against itself. For example, in the paradigm case of
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,3 4 there was simply no
reason to believe that a group of white medical professors and/or administrators were "out to get" whites or were likely to be unjustifiably
hostile toward the claims of whites. 35 The key word here is "unjustifiably," since the white committee was hostile toward Bakke's claim that
minorities should not be favored because of their race. The justice of
the competing claims, however, was not at all clear, neither side having
a monopoly of truth, wisdom and righteousness on its side.36 With the
just solution so unclear, the only question should have been the bias of
the decisionmaker and not the correctness of the decision. Since there
was no reason to suspect the white committee of bias toward whites, its
decision should have been allowed to stand.37
There is one exceptional type of circumstance, however, in which
discrimination against a dominant political group may be suspect:
when the classification, although nominally harmful to a dominant
group, in fact proceeds on the assumption that a traditionally disfavored group is inferior. For example, if a law were to provide that a
Caucasian employer shall be financially liable for all thefts committed
by his Negro employees against third persons, the Caucasian employer
33. See L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958); Loewy, supra note 4.
34. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
35. See Ely, The Constitutionalityof Reverse RacialDiscrimination,41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723

(1974).
Equal Citizensh v Under the
36. Compare Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword"
Fourteenth 4mendment, 91 HARV. L. Rv. 1, 52-53 (1977),and Sandalow, RacialPreferences in
Higher Education: PoliticalResponsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 682-92
(1975), with Posner, The DeFunis Case andthe Constitutionalio,ofPreferentialTreatment ofRacial

Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 1,7-19.
37. That a program favoring one minority, such as blacks, may incidentally disadvantage
another minority, such as Jews, is immaterial. An otherwise qualified Jew who is displaced'by a
black is not denied admission because he is Jewish and not Christian. Rather, he is denied ad-

mission because he is white and not black.
Mr. Justice Powell unfortunately did not find the analysis expressed in text accompanying

this note persuasive. 98 S. Ct. at 2751-53.
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should be able successfully to challenge the law. Consider, also, the
law inveighed against by Charles Dickens' Mr. Bumble, which provided that when a wife commits a crime in the presence of her husband
the husband is the more guilty because the law supposes that the wife
acted under the husband's direction. It will be recalled that Mr. Bumble exclaimed, "If the law supposes that, .

.

. the law is a ass-a id-

iot.' '38 In fact, if the law supposes that, it is worse than an ass-it is an
unconstitutional ass.39
The proposed test does not provide special equal protection scrutiny for laws that impinge upon fundamental rights. The reason for
not so providing is that a right that is sufficiently fundamental to warrant special constitutional solicitude should be protected by some other
provision of the Constitution. For example, the Court could and
should have analyzed the Boraas40 and Baird 41 cases in terms of the
fundamental rights (association and privacy) involved in those cases
rather than under the analytically extraneous equal protection clause.
Similarly, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,42 the fundamental nature of the
right to procreate shourd have required a hearing prior to sterilization,
without regard to whether a distinction between thieves and embezzlers
was permissible.43
Occasionally, a statute involving a fundamental right will appear
to be unconstitutional only because of the classification it makes. A
surface analysis would suggest that such a statute creates an equal protection problem. For example, in Police Department v. Mosely,44 the
Court invalidated an ordinance prohibiting picketing near a school on
the ground that bona fide labor disputes were excepted from the prohibition. The Court assumed arguendo that a ban on all picketing would
have been permissible, but held that the equal protection clause forbade drawing a distinction based on the content of a picketer's
message. Although the Mosely result is unobjectionable, use of the
38. C. DICKENS, THE ADVENTURES OF OLIVER TWIST (LONDON 1835), quotedin Calfano v.

Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 n.10 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).

39. Assuming, of course, that women are sufficiently analogous politically to a racial minority
to distrust legislative action against them. See text accompanying notes 55-62 infra.
40. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), discussedin text accompanying notes
11-17 supra.
41. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), discussed in text accompanying notes 18-23
supra.
42. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
43. Mr. Justice Stone favored this solution. Id. at 544 (concurring opinion).

44. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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equal protection clause was not necessary to reach it. The first amendment normally forbids, or at least requires strong justification for, any
law that discriminates among speakers on the basis of content.45 Such a
statute is proscribed because it regulates speech directly rather than
merely regulating the time, place and manner of speech, not because it
is unequal. A statute that forbids all picketing in front of a school, on
the other hand, is not regulating content and therefore may not violate
the first amendment. Once again, however, equal protection is essentially irrelevant.
The proposed test rejects the concept of "compelling state interest." That phrase is entirely appropriate in the context of the first
amendment 46-when one seeks to justify a law that would otherwise
violate a clear mandate of the Constitution, it is not asking too much
that a compelling interest be established to justify the law's existence.
When, however, the question is dissipation of indicia of suspectness,
the term "compelling state interest" is unclear at best and misleading at
worst. Moreover, the Court has frequently employed the term in such
a way that virtually no justification could meet the standard.47 The
Court's alternative term, "strict scrutiny," also fails to offer guidance
concerning what factors the Court should look to in ascertaining the
constitutionality vel non of the challenged law.
The proposed test focuses upon the precise factors the Court
should consider in adjudicating an equal protection claim. If the basis
of the equal protection challenge is the unjustifiably high risk that the
decisionmaker (a legislature or administrative agency for example) is
biased against the complaining group, the reviewing court ought to
look for objective evidence that discrimination was not the purpose of
the statute. 8 The test requires that this evidence be sufficient to render
it probable that the discriminatory effect was merely an incidental
45. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
46. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
47. In Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), Chief Justice Burger lamented: "Some lines
must be drawn. To challenge such lines by the 'compelling state interest' standard is to condemn
them all. So far as I am aware, no state law has ever satisfied this seemingly insurmountable
standard, and I doubt one ever will, for it demands nothing less than perfection." Id. at 363-64
(dissenting opinion). But Gf United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (government had a
compelling interest in assuring availability of selective service certificates issued).

48. The term "objective evidence" refers to purposes that could justify the statute, whether the
legislature thought of them or not. This is preferable to trying to ascertain the legislative motive,
which is frequently mixed or unclear. Furthermore, as the Court has noted: "[T]here is an element of futility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a law because of the bad motives of its supporters. If the law is struck down for this reason, rather than because of its facial content or effect, it
would presumably be valid as soon as the legislature or relevant governing body re-passed it for
different reasons." Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971). CompareAbele v. Markle, 342
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adjunct of the legitimate, nondiscriminatory purpose.4 9

Although mere invocation of the proposed test does not automatically answer every difficult equal protection question, it does provide a
relevant and realistic framework for the Court.
GENDER CLASSIFICATIONS

The Supreme Court's current rule in regard to gender based

classifications is: "[T]o withstand constitutional challenge, [such
classifications] must serve important governmental objectives and must
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives. ' 50 The
proposed test differs in that, first, it would not hold laws that discriminate against males to the same standard of justification as those that
discriminate against females, 5' and second, it would require objective

evidence of a nondiscriminatory purpose rather than evidence that the
classification supports an important governmental objective.
The statutes involved in the gender classification decisions of the
seventies can be divided into three basic categories: those that discrimi-

nate against women, those that discriminate against men, and those in
which it is debatable upon which sex the discrimination is perpetrated.
This article will first consider those cases involving discrimination
against women-Reed v. Reed,52 Frontierov. Richardson5 3 and Stanton
54
v. Stanton.

The initial question under the proposed test is whether women are
sufficiently analogous politically to a racial minority to warrant dis-

trusting a legislative or administrative decision that discriminates
against them.

Certainly some analogies can be drawn.

Both have

been the subject of derogatory and paternalistic stereotyping;" both
F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972), with Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1972). Consequently, when there is objective evidence of a nondiscriminatory purpose, the Court should refrain from analyzing the sufficiency of that purpose on the ground that the legislature did not
enact the law for that reason.
49. See Bice, Standards of Judicial Review Under the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses, 50 s.CAL. L. REv. 689, 695 (1977).
50. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
51. Looking at the Court's decisions discussed in this section vis-a-vis its rhetoric, one could
argue that the Court has not always regarded laws discriminating against males with the same
suspicion as laws discriminating against females.
52. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
53. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
54. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
55. Even the Supreme Court has not been immune from the tendency to stereotype women:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity
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have highly visible and virtually immutable 56 physical characteristics
distinguishing them from the majority of the legislators. Indeed, in
some respects women are more "discrete and insular ' '57 than blacks:
they were not guaranteed the vote until 1920;58 they could not take up
certain occupations until quite recently;59 and until 1974 one of their
number could be tried for murdering a member of the opposite sex
before a jury from which members of her sex were systematically
excluded.'6
Although in some respects the analogy is imperfect,6" when a
predominantly male legislature or administrative agency enacts a law
or regulation that in fact discriminates against women, in order for that
law or regulation to pass constitutional muster it is not too much to
require objective evidence of a nondiscriminatory purpose sufficient to
render it probable that the discrimination is merely an adjunct to the
and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the
divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that
which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not
to say identity, of interests and views which belong, or should belong, to the family
institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent
career from that of her husband.
...The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.
BradweU v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873).
56. Transsexual operations are the exception.
57. The phrase, of course, is from Mr. Justice Stone's famous opinion in United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938): "Nor need we enquire. . . whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Id. at 153 n.4. There seems to
be no significant difference between Stone's phrase "discrete and insular minority" and the phrase
"sufficiently analogous politically to a racial minority to distrust a legislative or administrative
action discriminating against it." Consequently these phrases will be employed interchangeably
throughout the article. The proposed test is not couched in Stone's language because by emphasizing the political analogy to a racial minority, the relationship to the general purpose of the
equal protection clause is made more apparent.
58. The 19th amendment was adopted in 1920. Prior to that, the Court had rejected the
claim that women have a constitutional right to vote. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 162 (1875).
59. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). Goesaert was not officially disapproved
until December 20, 1976, in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.23 (1976). See also Bradwell v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). Cf.Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (state may
restrict working hours of women).
60. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), effectively obiyeledin Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522 (1975).
61. Women do constitute a full 50% (and in many states, a majority) of the electorate. Thus,
unlike blacks, if they are dissatisfied with the white male legislature, they can (at least theoretically) "throw the rascals out." In addition, their role as wives, mothers, sisters and daughters of
male legislators gives them somewhat more political clout than blacks have with white legislators.
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legitimate, nondiscriminatory purpose.62

Reed v. Reed63 was a relatively easy case for a unanimous
Supreme Court. Speaking through Chief Justice Burger, the Court addressed the question whether an Idaho law that favored males over
females of the same degree of kinship in the appointment of administrators of decedents' estates comported with equal protection:
We hold that it does not. To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish
the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of
arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment; and whatever may be said as to the
positive values of avoiding intrafamily controversy, the choice in this
context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex. '
This deceptively simple ipse dixit masks a disturbing lack of analysis. To be sure, the male-favoring legislation is arbitrary in the sense
that males are not always more qualified than females of equal kinship
to administer an estate. It is not, however, arbitrary, in the sense of
unreasonable or capricious, to maximize the number of estate administration contests resolved by general rule rather than specific litigation.65
Indeed, if the Idaho statute had provided that when the contestants are
equally related the older contestant shall prevail, it is doubtful that the
Court would have invalidated the provision.66 Yet, when administration contests are actually held, it is not unreasonable to believe that
equally related males in fact prevail over females more frequently than
equally related older people prevail over younger people. 6 7 The difference, of course, is that a legislative judgment that men should prevail
62. Since gender-based classifications were operative when the 14th amendment was adopted
and the framers of the amendment did not perceive the analogy between blacks and women, one
could argue that they intended to permanently allow such classifications. The difficulty with this
argument is that it attributes too much specificity to a general clause in "a constitution intended to
endure for the ages to come." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). There
is no apparent reason to attribute to the framers a desire to freeze human knowledge as of 1868.
Consequently, if more than a century of learning has enabled us to perceive a previously unrecognized analogy, it is indeed better that our acceptance of it be late than never.
63. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
64. Id. at 76-77.
65. Cf.Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) (constitutionality of duration-of-relationship
requirement for social security benefits upheld).
66. Cf.Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (mandatory retirement for uniformed state police officer at age 50 upheld), discussedintext accompanying notes 610 supra; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (state can set voting age at 21 years in local
election contrary to Voting Rights Act).
67. Although the appointment of males in administration contests may sometimes result from
prejudice against females, on other occasions the choice would be made because in our society the
male often has more education and business experience.
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over women is (to use Professor
John Hart Ely's terms) a judgment that
"we" are better than "they." 68
Analyzing Reed under the proposed test, it is clear that the elimination of estate administration contests is a nondiscriminatory purpose.
Whether it is sufficient to render it probable that the discriminatory
effect was merely an incidental adjunct of the legitimate, nondiscriminatory purpose is a more difficult question. On balance, the legitimate
purpose does not seem sufficient for two reasons: first, Idaho did not
deem tie-breaking in estate administration disputes to be sufficiently
important to provide for any less suspect classification, such as age; and
second, the actual administrative inconvenience in holding a hearing to
choose among contestants is relatively trivial.6 9
Of course, this analysis, unlike the Court's, would allow Idaho to
enact legislation preferring women over men in the administration of
estates. However, if a predominantly male legislature were to enact
such a law, one could be reasonably certain that it really believed that
administrative convenience was more important than ascertaining the
best qualified administrator. Surely nobody would say that the legislature wanted to "put men in their place."7
Frontiero v. Richardson 7 invalidated a statute granting all married
men in the uniformed services a spousal dependency allowance, but
granting such an allowance to a woman only if she could establish that
she provided her husband with more than half of his support. Under
either the Court's test or the proposed test, the law obviously discriminates against women in that a man who does not provide more than
half of his spouse's support gets the allowance anyway, whereas a similarly situated woman does not.7" Administrative expense can hardly
68. Ely's "we-they" theory is most fully developed in Note, MentalIllness:A Suspect Classjcation?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1245-58 (1974). See also Ely, supra note 35, at 727-36.
69. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 235 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Indeed,
before Reed reached the Supreme Court, Idaho had enacted prospective legislation abolishing the
challenged legislation. Law of Mar. 12, 1971, ch. I l I, § 1, 1971 Idaho Gen. Laws 233 (codified at
Idaho Code § 15-3-203 (Cum. Supp. 1977)). Inasmuch as this prospective legislation was enacted
subsequent to the commencement of the Reed suit, it is possible that it may have been motivated
partially by constitutional as opposed to policy reasons. Nevertheless, Idaho's decision not to
await the outcome of the litigation suggests that it did not consider retention of the gender-based
classification necessary.
70. Arguably, one could contend that such a statute would reflect a desire on the part of the
male legislators to retain their jobs with their female constituents. It is highly unlikely, however,
that a legislator would perceive support of such a statute to be politically beneficial. The statute
would alienate nearly all men in addition to those women who believe in equality. Thus, it is not
surprising that no such statutes appear to exist.
71. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
72. The discrimination was particularly acute in Lieutenant Frontiero's case in that she was
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justify the statute, because the cost of ascertaining actual dependency
surely could not exceed the amount of support money expended on
servicemen with nondependent wives.73 Furthermore, the incremental
cost of extending a dependency allowance to all married servicewomen
would not have been substantial since women only constituted about
one percent of the service personnel.7"
The only possible basis for sustaining the statute is that a husband

usually has a legal duty to support his wife, whereas a wife does not as
frequently have a duty to support her husband.7 5 The statute might be

analogized to one that provides a dependency allowance for those who
are either legally obligated to support or are in fact supporting a
spouse. The difficulties with this argument are that some support stat-

utes are sex neutral, 76 and support laws do not require furnishing more
than half the support of the other spouse. Thus, if Lieutenant Fron-

tiero had been under a duty to support similar to the one imposed on a
man, the less-than-half support she provided her husband would have
discharged that duty. Therefore, there appears to be no objective evidence of a nondiscriminatory purpose sufficient to render it probable
that the discrimination against servicewomen was merely an incidental

adjunct to a legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose.
Stanton v. Stanton7 7 involved a Utah statute providing for the at-

tainment of majority at age eighteen by females, but at age twenty-one
by males. Specifically at issue was a Utah court order pursuant to the
statute requiring a father to support his daughter until age eighteen and
his son until age twenty-one.78 If the statute had merely provided for
extended support entitlement for males vis-a-vis females, this would

have been a clear case of lawful discrimination. 79 By providing that
females attained their majority at eighteen, however, the legislature
earning $443.70 per month, completely supporting herself and contributing $149 to her husband's
support. However, because her husband was receiving veteran's benefits of $205 per montli, he
was not technically her dependent. Id. at 680 n.4.
73. This is particularly so since a wife who, like Lieutenant Frontiero's husband, furnishes
slightly more than 25% of the total family income normally would not be a dependent. See
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 203 n.3 (1977).
74. 411 U.S. at 681.
75. See Weitzman. Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REv.
1169, 1180 (1974).
76. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-6-101 (1973).
77. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
78. According to Mr. Justice Rehnquist, it was unclear whether or not the Utah court order
was pursuant to the statute. 421 U.S. at 19-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
79. The Utah Supreme Court observed that "it is a salutary thing for [a male] to get a good
education and/or training before he undertakes [the responsibility of providing a home for his
family]." Stanton v. Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 319, 517 P.2d 1010, 1012 (1974). The enactment by
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was permitting them to make binding contracts at an earlier age and
generally to be treated as mature persons prior to males. In one sense
then the legislation seems far from being suspect since one could contend that legislatures normally think of minorities as requiring more,
not less, maturation time.8 ' Nevertheless, it appears the Supreme Court
rightly invalidated the age differential in the support provisions of the
statute.8 2 The impact of the less-than-equal-support provision is clearly
detrimental to women; indeed, it handicaps them in obtaining the very
thing they need most to achieve parity with men-a college education.8 3 Thus, the predominantly male legislature appears to have taken
more from women than it gave them in terms of preparation for life.
In fact, even the earlier statutory maturation age may be the result of a
stereotype that women mature as much as they are going to by age
eighteen while men continue to mature until age twenty-one. Thus, the
Stanton result seems correct.
Craig v. Boren 4 also involved a sex-age classification, but this
time the discrimination was against males. The Oklahoma statute in
issue provided that females could buy 3.2% beer at age eighteen
whereas males could not until age twenty-one. The Supreme Court,
relying on Stanton and Reed, held that this statute violated the equal
protection clause. The proposed test rejects this result.
It is quite signficant that the sex-age distinction at issue was the
only one that the Oklahoma legislators chose to retain in 1972 when,
pursuant to a federal court of appeals decision, 5 the legislature sexneutralized its age of majority laws. Objectively, the retention of the
a predominantly male legislature of a law that has as its apparent purpose the perpetuation of
male domination or female subservience creates a classic case of unequal protection.
80. Some aspects of Utah law were sex neutral as to age of majority, however: every citizen
satisfying residency requirements could vote at the age of 21; every citizen 21 years of age could
serve as a juror, be admitted to the practice of law, and serve as an incorporator so long as such
person met nonsex requirements; no one, male or female, could purchase tobacco if under 19
years of age; motor vehicle licenses were issued with respect to age only; juvenile court jurisdiction
applied to males and females under a certain age; and every person 18 years of age or older could
make a will. 421 U.S. at 15-16.
81. For example, it is virtually unthinkable that a predominantly white legislature would provide that blacks are sutjurls at 18 whereas whites must wait until 21.
82. It did not invalidate any of the other gender-based age of majority differentials in the
Utah statute. However, it is doubtful that any of them can survive Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976), discussed in text accompanying notes 84-86 infra.
83. Cf. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (requirement that black
graduate student be physically segregated struck down as detrimental to his education); Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (separate Texas law school for black students held substantially unequal to law school for whites).
84. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
85. Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972).
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statute was understandable since the facts showed that more than ten
times as many men as women aged eighteen to twenty were arrested for
driving under the influence of alcohol.86 Since the legislation did not
discriminate against a politically powerless group, 7 was reenacted at a
time when the legislature reevaluated all and eliminated all other sex
classifications, and is supported by objectively valid reasons, there is no
reason to suspect the legislature of being unjustifiably hostile toward
young men. Therefore the legislation should have been sustained.
Califano v. Webster,8 8 which upheld a statute rendering women
eligible for social security benefits at an earlier age than men,8 9 was
clearly correct. The discrimination was against men, not women. The
apparent rationale of the statute was to compensate women for past job
discrimination that resulted in lower paying jobs than men. As the
Supreme Court indicated, there is nothing suspicious about this judgment. Indeed, prior to the initiation of this law suit, Congress had
prospectively reduced the eligibility age for men to that for women, 90

thereby demonstrating that a dominant political group is not likely to
perpetuate unfair discrimination against itself.
86. 429 U.S. at 201 n.8. These figures do not necessarily suggest that 3.2% beer, as compared
with more potent alcoholic beverages, causes the higher incidence of driving under the influence
among young men. However, a legislature might reasonably conclude that allowing young men to
purchase 3.2% beer might exacerbate this already unfortunate situation. Consequently, it is difficult to fathom Mr. Justice Stewart's conclusion that "[t]he disparity created by these Oklahoma
statutes amounts to total irrationality." Id. at 215 (Stewart, J., concurring). To be sure, some
legislators may have voted for this classification for less noble motives. For example:
A 1973 legislative attempt to equalize the age-sex reservation for beer also failed because
of sectarian opposition. The principal preacher appearing to oppose age-sex equalization for beer testified that its retention was necessary to preserve young men from the
"pool, beer, and girls" syndrome. See article, "Committee Votes to Adjust Legal BeerBuying to Age 19", Tulsa Tribune, Tuesday, February 13, 1973, page one. (Although
the exposure of young women to pool, beer and men did not appear to pose any theological problems.)
Brief for Appellant at 11 n.2, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). However, as a colleague of mine
astutely observed: "If legislation could be invalidated because some jackass voted for it for the
wrong reason, there would be very few valid laws on the books." See note 48 supra; Vf.Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217(1971) (no denial of equal protection when city closes swimming pools,
claiming pools could not be operated safely on an integrated basis). See generaly Ely, Legislative
andAdministrativeMotivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
87. Even if young men could be conceptualized as a politically powerless group, there is no
reason to think that they are more powerless than young women. While most of the legislators
are currently not young men, they were never young women.
88. 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
89. The age of eligibility was 62 for women and 65 for men.
90. "[T]he number of an individual's elapsed years is the number of calendar years after 1950
• . .and before the year in which he died, or if it occurred earlier but after 1960, the year in which
he attained age 62." Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, § 215, 49 Stat. 620 (formerly
codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 415(b) (1970)) (amended 1972). The statute did not apply to
Webster, who turned 65 in 1974.
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Schlesinger v. Ballard9 upheld a federal statute terminating a
male Navy lieutenant's service after he was twice considered and rejected for promotion.92 Lieutenant Ballard argued that this statute denied him equal protection because he was discharged after nine years
in rank, whereas a female lieutenant could not be discharged until she

had completed thirteen years in rank.93 The Court upheld the discrimination as justifiable compensation to women for their relative lack of

opportunity for promotion. Mr. Justice Brennan, for the four dissenters, argued that congressional inadvertence rather than intentional
compensatory motives was responsible for the statute. He also ex-

pressed doubt about the propriety of justifying one gender based
classification upon another. Finally, he concluded that since the

government conceded that this gender based classification was no
longer needed, it could hardly94be found to serve an overriding or com-

pelling governmental interest.

The proposed test would reject Brennan's analysis and reach a re-

sult in accord with the majority. First, since the particular discrimination at issue was against men, there is no reason to apply any form of
strict scrutiny to the classification. Second, by noting the relative difficulty that women have in achieving promotion, the Court is not approving that discrimination; it is simply observing that compensatory
legislation should not be invalidated. In addition, the examination of
91. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
92. (a) Each officer on the active list of the Navy serving in the grade of lieutenant,
except an officer in the Nurse Corps, and each officer on the active list of the Marine
Corps serving in the grade of captain shall be honorably discharged on June 30 of the
fiscal year in which he is considered as having failed of selection for promotion to the
grade of lieutenant commander or major for the second time. However, if he so requests, he may be honorably discharged at any time during that fiscal year.
(d) This section does not apply to women officers appointed under section 5590 of this
title or to officers designated for limited duty.
10 U.S.C. § 6382 (1976).
93. (a) Each woman officer on the active list of the Navy, appointed under section 5590
of this title, who holds a permanent appointment in the grade of lieutenant and each
woman officer on the active list of the Marine Corps who holds a permanent appointment in the grade of captain shall be honorably discharged on June 30 of the fiscal year
in which(I) she is not on a promotion list, and
(2) she has completed 13 years of active commissioned service in the Navy or in
the Marine Corps.
However, if she so requests, she may be honorably discharged at any time during that
fiscal year.
10 U.S.C. § 6401 (1976).
94. 419 U.S. at 511-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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actual motives tends to be a fruitless endeavor-neither Brennan's evidence that the discrimination was inadvertent 95 nor the Court's evidence that it was intentional 96 is compelling. 97 Finally, the strongest

justification for Ballard is that, overall, men are not obviously treated
less favorably than women. While Lieutenant Ballard can be dis-

charged four years earlier than a woman for nonpromotion, he is guaranteed the right during this shorter period to be twice considered for

promotion. A woman lieutenant has no such right. Although for thirteen years she cannot be discharged for lack of promotion, there is no
guarantee that during that time she will be considered for promotion.

Whether her situation is better than that of Lieutenant Ballard is, to say
the least, debatable.

Since a predominantly male Congress enacted

this classification, the Court rightly rejected Lieutenant Ballard's
challenge.
Weinberger v. Weisenfeld98 involved a provision of the Social Security Act granting benefits to a widow from her deceased husband's
social security insurance if she had minor children and little or no in-

come,99 without granting comparable benefits to a similarly situated
widower. To some extent, the issue seemed to be whether the discrimi-

nation was against surviving widowers or deceased female social security contributors.

Concluding that the discrimination was against

women social security contributors, the Court, relying on Frontiero,
struck down the statute.
95. The number of years selected for women line lieutenants, 13, corresponded exactly to
the normal number of years Congress intended to precede separation for a male officer
not chosen for promotion. Thus, Congress' original purpose in enacting slightly different
separation provisions for men and women is quite certain to create the same tenure in
years for women lieutenants as for the average male lieutenant before involuntary separation was permitted.
However, for reasons not entirely clear upon the record in this case, the promotion
zone system for men did not, as administered by the Navy, result in the normal 13-year
tenure for men ....
Id. at 513 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96. "When it enacted legislation eliminating many of the former restrictions on women
officers' participation in the naval service in 1967, Congress expressly left undisturbed
the 13-year tenure provision of § 6401. And both the House and the Senate Reports
observed that the attrition provisions governing women line officers would parallel present provisions with respect to male officers except that the dischargeofmale officersprobably occurs about 2 years earlier."
Id. at 505 (quoting S. REP. No. 676, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 216, 90th
Cong., Ist Sess. 17 (1967)).
97. This, of course, is not surprising since evidence of subjective legislative motive is usually
doubtful. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968); Kelly, supra note 30. See
generally Ely, supra note 48.
98. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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The proposed test would produce the same result. At one level, of
course, the statute discriminates against widowers. However, it is
somewhat reminiscent of Mr. Bumble's exasperation with the law."°
Just as a husband should not be held liable for his wife's crime simply
because a predominantly male legislature (or judiciary) presumed she
was following his orders, he should not be denied social security benefits simply because a predominantly male Congress decided that a
widow with children ought to have the option to remain in "her place,"
the home, whereas a man, even a widower With children, should get out
and work.
Calfano v. Goldfarb'° ' presented an issue similar to Weisenfeld.

Under a different provision of the Social Security Act, a sixty year old
widow of a man insured under social security was automatically entitled to certain benefits, while a widower of a similarly insured woman
was entitled to such benefits only if he could establish that his wife had
provided him with more than half of his support.10 2 Weisenfeld was
distinguishable because in that case a widower could never get benefits,
whereas in Goldfarb he could get benefits if he could establish dependency. Nevertheless, a four-Justice plurality concluded that, as in
Front/ero, the requirement of proving dependency unconstitutionally
discriminated against women. Justice Stevens concurred on the
ground that the provision unconstitutionally discriminated against
men. 0 3 Stevens and the four dissenters distinguished Frontiero on the
ground that social security payments are not really a form of
compensation.' ° 4
Like Stephen Weisenfeld, however, Leon Goldfarb appears to be
the victim of a male chauvinist attitude that men upon their deaths
should always provide for their wives, whereas women, being the
weaker sex, are under no such obligation. The equal protection clause
group the power to enact legislation
should deny a politically dominant
0 5
perpetuating such a stereotype.
100. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
101. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 402(f)(1) (1970) (surviving husband); id. § 402(e)(1) (1970) (surviving wife).

103. 230 U.S. at 217-224 (Stevens, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 217 n. I (Stevens, J., concurring), 228-29 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart and Blackmun, JJ.).
105. Ifa consequence of this reasoning is that a statutory forced share provided for a woman
but not a man from the estate of the deceased spouse is unconstitutional, so be it.
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Kahn v. Shevin, °6 which upheld a Florida statute granting a property tax exemption to widows but not widowers, is under the proposed
test the most difficult of the gender based classification cases. In some
respects, the classification is very much like those later invalidated in
Weisenfeld and Goldfarb in that the male-dominated legislature is arguably saying that becoming a widow entails greater loss than becoming a widower. This conclusion is buttressed by the statutory provision
that grants the exemption to "every widow or person who is blind or
totally and permanently disabled."10 7 The predominantly male legislature determined that one who has lost the use of his or her eyes or
body, or has lost a male spouse, is entitled to a tax exemption. However, a person such as Mr. Kahn, who has "merely" lost a female
spouse, is not so entitled. Despite these indicia of legislative stereotyping, the Court in Kahn probably reached the correct result. Unlike the
benefits in Weisenfeld and Goldfarb, the Kahn exemption does not depend upon the contribution of the deceased spouse-a widow gets the
tax exemption whether her husband was a taxpaying citizen all of his
life or a worthless bum. Therefore, the Florida legislation cannot
meaningfully be said to discriminate against the late Mrs. Kahn.
Rather, it clearly discriminates against men.
It can still be argued that the statute has an impermissible chauvinistic protectionist purpose rather than a permissible compensatory
one. If it were truly designed to compensate women for a discriminatory job market, one would expect it to apply to all women, not merely
widows. 0 8 Florida, however, could surely decide that a tax exemption
should be limited to people who have suffered the loss of something
such as sight, body use or a spouse. If the state can allow those who
have lost a spouse to be treated differently from those who have not, a
judgment that widows tend to face greater economic discrimination
than widowers in the job market seems to be sufficient objective evidence of a nonchauvinistic' 0 9 purpose to warrant upholding this
statute.
106. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
107. "Property to the value of five hundred dollars ($500) of every widow, blind person, or
totally and permanently disabled person who is a bona fide resident of this state shall be exempt
from taxation." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 196.202 (Harrison 1974).
108. See Ginsburg, Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1973 and 1974 Terms, 1975 Sup. CT.
REV.1, 5 n.29.

109. When concerned with a situation in which the alleged denial of equal protection is premised on stereotyping a discrete and insular group in such a way that legislation redounds to the

detriment of some members of the more politically dominant group, the word "nonchauvinistie"
seems more appropriate than "nondiscriminatory."
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In sum, if the Court were to adopt the proposed test, its results in
the area of gender based discrimination would not change significantly.
Indeed, only one of the nine cases discussed above, Craig v. Boren,
would have been decided differently. Nevertheless, besides being closer
to the general purpose of the equal protection clause, the proposed test
would give legislatures a clearer idea than they currently have regarding the kinds of statutes they should avoid enacting.
ILLEGITIMACY

In some respects, illegitimacy is not analogous to racial minority
status. An illegitimate, unlike a black or a woman, does not look any
different from the majority of legislators. Furthermore, antibastard legislation is not pervasive, but has been limited to treating the illegitimate
less well than his legitimate half-sibling only in regard to parental obligations and third-party or governmental obligations predicated upon
an injury to or incapacitation or death of a parent. Laws that discriminate against corporations because its incorporators or officers are illegitimate" 0 or laws that mandate separate schools for illegitimates"I
simply have not been part of the American scene.
Nevertheless, in some respects illegitimates very nearly constitute
the paradigmatic discrete and insular minority. No group is politically
weaker; nobody carries signs in a parade reading "Bastard Power"-very few would proudly proclaim, "I am a bastard." The status
of illegitimacy is immutable, at least from the illegitimate's perspective;" 2 it is an accident of birth over which the illegitimate has no control. Thus, when the legislature imposes special disadvantages upon
this group, there ought to be objective evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose sufficient to render it probable that the discrimination was merely an incidental adjunct to a legitimate purpose, rather
to heap additional disadvantages upon the
than an attempt
13

illegitimate.'

110. "[W]ould a corporation, which is a 'person,' for certain purposes, within the meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause (Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125
U.S. 181, 189) forego recovery for wrongs done its interests because its incorporators were all

bastards?" Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
111.

See Brief for Executive Council of the Episcopal Church in the U.S.A. and the Ameri-

can Jewish Congress as Amici Curiae at 13-14, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).

See

Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana-FirstDecisions on EqualPro-

tection and Paterni, 36 U. CHi. L. REv. 338, 342 n.17 (1969).
112. Of course, his parents can sometimes change his status.
113. Some of the disadvantages suffered by illegitimates include a tendency to be lower in
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When the law treats an illegitimate less favorably than his legitimate half-sibling in his relations with his mother, the discrimination is
rarely if ever justified. The problem of proof, with the concomitant
potential for fraud, that can occur when an illegitimate claims that a
particular individual is his father cannot occur in regard to his mother.
Indeed, most states do not discriminate against an illegitimate in regard
to his relationship with his mother.' 14 In the only Supreme Court case
involving such discrimination, Levy v. Louisiana,"5 the Supreme Court
invalidated a Louisiana law that granted a wrongful death remedy to
the legitimate children of a woman killed by a tortfeasor but denied
such a remedy to the woman's illegitimate children. Under the proposed test, Levy was clearly correct. There is no basis for the statute
other than the desire to treat illegitimates less favorably than legitimates. To some, in view of the importance of traditional families, this
basis alone might seem sufficient. The distinction made by such a law,
however, is not between types of living arrangements 16 but between
classes of children, and the bare desire to relegate an illegitimate to an
inferior status is precisely the sort of thing that the equal protection
clause was designed to obliterate.
An illegitimate's rights in regard to his father present more
problems. One of the most basic needs of the illegitimate is financial
support. Most states have chosen to hold fathers responsible for the
support of their illegitimate children. Often, however, such statutes
owe their existence not to the altruistic ideal that all children should
enjoy the support of their father, but to the less noble concern that it is
better for fathers to feed their illegitimate
offspring than for taxpayers
17
to be saddled with that responsibility.
The Texas legislature chose not to enact such a statute, and thus,
in Texas, a legitimate child was legally entitled to paternal support
while an illegitimate child was not. In Gomez v. Perez,118 the Court
general knowledge, oral ability, creativity, perceptual development, reading attainment and arithmetical skills. See Pringle, Born Illegitimate-Bornat a Risk, 18 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC RESEARCH
229 (1974).
114. For example, "[a] child born out of wedlock. . . inherit[s] from his mother in all states."
E. SCOLES & E. HALBACH, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 57
(1973).
115. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
116. E.g., New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973), discussedin text

accompanying notes 142-43 infra.
117. "The legislation is social in nature and was enacted to prevent illegitimates from becoming public charges. The benefit to the child is incidental." Allen v. Hunnicutt, 230 N.C. 49,51, 52
S.E.2d 18, 19 (1949).
118. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
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rather summarily invalidated this classification by holding that an illegitimate child was entitled to support from his father. Although this
result has much surface logic, it seems that in fact the case was wrongly
decided. While one should be suspicious of a legislative judgment disfavoring illegitimates, such suspicion should not extend to a judgment
that taxpayers rather than fathers must support the child. After all,
men who father illegitimate children whom they refuse to support may
be less popular with the legislature than the illegitimates themselves.' 19
Thus, it would seem that the legislature would not continue to exempt
such fathers from their support obligations without a good reason for
doing so. In short, unlike other discrimination against illegitimates,
this type of discrimination does not appear to be
the kind that needs
1 20
special protection from the majoritarian process.
Intestate succession is an area in which the illegitimate's relationship to his father has been a constant source of litigation. When the
relationship has not been established prior to the putative father's
death, there is good reason to uphold state statutes excluding the illegitimate from claiming as a child of the deceased-estates would be difficult to finalize if an alleged illegitimate child could establish his claim
at any time. 1 ' Although this problem can be substantially ameliorated
119. This is not to suggest that fathers of illegitimates are analogous politically to a racial

minority. They differ in that they are largely responsible for their situation. See text accompanyingnotes 136-41 infra.
120. Objectively speaking, why would a legislature exempt illegitimate fathers from their duty
to support? One possible reason is the danger of the wrong person being found to be the father.

Scientific tests cannot establish paternity to a certainty; they can merely disprove it in certain
cases. Furthermore, juries tend to find paternity when the defendant can afford to support the
child, sometimes even when the evidence is to the contrary. See e.g., Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal.
App. 2d 652, 169 P.2d 442 (1946). Such a finding tends to socially stigmatize the defendant, who

may or may not deserve the stigma. A legislature that does not impose a duty of support on the
father of an illegitimate might be effectively saying that it is more important to prevent the possibility of misidentification and accompanying stigma than it is to ensure paternal support. Although many would not agree with this ordering of priorities, it seems sufficiently substantial to
render it probable that the discrimination against the illegitimate was merely an incidental adjunct
of a legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose.
Of course, if the putative father had formally acknowledged the child there would not have
been a danger of misidentification, and there would be no quarrel with the Gomez result. Indeed,

had the putative father been living with the mother in a monogamous relationship for several
weeks surrounding the conception of the child, the result might have been justified. This was not

the case, however. See text accompanying notes 131-36 infra.
This analysis of Gomez does permit a gender based classification since mothers of illegiti-

mates are obligated to support them. However, the gender classification is sustainable, principally
because the danger of misidentification, which justified exempting fathers, is not applicable in
regard to mothers.
121.
1969).

See, e.g., Jerry Vogel Music Co. v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 425 F.2d 834 (2d Cir.
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by a statute of limitations on heirship claims, 122 no similar remedy is
available for intentional or unintentional misidentification. This problem is magnified when the putative father is not available to present his
side of the case and can be posthumously and defenselessly stigmatized
as the father of an illegitimate.
When fatherhood has been established prior to the decedent's
death, these considerations are not so significant. Particularly when
the father has acknowledged the child as his own there seems to be no
justifiable rationale for disinheritance. Yet in Labine v. Vincent,' 23 the
Court upheld a Louisiana statute that mandated disinheritance of a paternally acknowledged illegitimate who had lived with and been supported by her father all of her life. This and other provisions of the
Louisiana statute were so Draconian in their treatment of illegitimates
as to preclude the possibility that they were intended to do anything
other than "put the bastard in his place."' 2 4 Consequently, the Court
should have invalidated the statute.
Trimble v. Gordon,'2 5 which involved an attempt by an Illinois illegitimate to inherit the estate of the man who while living had been
judicially declared to be her father, effectively overruled Labine.
Trimble was actually a weaker case for the illegitimate since paternity
had been established by judicial proceeding rather than formal acknowledgment. 12 6 Nevertheless, if Illinois was satisfied with the determination of paternity for support purposes, that determination should
127
have been valid for inheritance purposes also.
122. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19(b) (Cum.Supp. 1977).
123. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
124. "Natural fathers and mothers can, in no case, dispose of property in favor of their adulterine or incestuous children, unless to the mere amount of what is necessary to their sustenance,
or to procure them an occupation or profession by which to support themselves." LA. Civ. CODE
ANN. art. 1488 (West 1952).
125. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
126. Thereafter the father openly, but apparently not formally, acknowledged the child as his
own. Id. at 764.
127. It could be argued, however, that since Mr. Gordon did not formally acknowledge his
child during his lifetime and even had to be judicially ordered to support her, he would prefer that
she not inherit his estate. Although this may be true, it would not seem sufficient to justify the
statute. When an individual desires to discriminate against a "discrete and insular minority," he
must do so on his own, not with the aid of the state. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for
Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 641-42 (1950); cf Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1948) (condemning racially restrictive covenants in private real estate sales). Thus, if Sherman Gordon
wished to discriminate against his illegitimate daughter, he should have been required to make a
will (as indeed he was required to do under the Court's decision). Although the Court appeared
to adopt this analysis, see 430 U.S. at 775 n.16, it purported to leave the question open on the
ground that effectuating the intestate's presumed intent was not the purpose of the statute. In so
doing, the Court improperly refused to evaluate this claimed justification. A statute should be
upheld when there is a valid justification for it, whether or not the legislature enacted it for that
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Logically, the next question is whether anything other than acknowledgment or adjudication can suffice for invalidating discriminatory treatment of an illegitimate in relation to his father. The strongest
possible case for such a holding was Weber v. Aetna Casualty Co.,128 in

which the illegitimate child had lived with her father and mother since
birth in a household that also included the father's four legitimate children. Upon the father's death in a work-related injury, Louisiana law
deprived the unacknowledged child of compensation because the funds
were exhausted by the legitimate children, whose claims by law were
satisfied first. Moreover, the child could not have been acknowledged
because of a Louisiana law that forbade acknowledgment while the fa29
ther was married to someone other than the child's mother.1 Of
course, the decedent had never been adjudicated the child's father since
his willing support of the child since birth precluded the necessity of
such a determination. The Court emphasized that only dependent
children could recover compensation and concluded that proof-of-paternity problems were not significant, apparently because men do not
normally voluntarily support other
men's children. Thus, it rightly in130
validated the Louisiana statute.
Mathews v. Lucas,'3 1 which involved a federal statute providing
social security benefits to all legitimate minor children of a deceased
insured, but denying such benefits to some illegitimate children, was a
much more difficult case. The statute certainly did not appear to be
one calculated to "put the bastard in his place." It allowed benefits to
illegitimate children who were in fact dependent upon the insured at
the time of his death or were living with him at that time. Even absent
this dependency, an illegitimate could obtain benefits if his parents had
reason. Otherwise, the legislature could simply reenact the law for constitutionally valid reasons.
See note 48 supra.
One might argue that the decision should have been prospective since, at the time of his
death, Gordon might have believed that it was unnecessary to make a will in order to disinherit
his daughter. However, it does not seem unjust to compel one who relies on intestacy laws to
assume the risk of their changing in one way or another.
128. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
129. At the time of his death, the father was married to a woman who was confined to a
mental institution and was the mother of his four legitimate children.
130. The litigation also involved a bastard born after the putative father's death. According
to the Court: "[A] posthumously born illegitimate child should be treated the same as a posthumously born legitimate child.
... 406 U.S. at 169 n.7. For the reasons presented in the discussion of Gomez v.Perez, note 120 supra, the proposed test would not normally require that identity
of treatment. In Weber, however, this result may have been justified because of the lengthy
monogamous relationship between the mother and the putative father. See the discussion of
Mathews v. Lucas in text accompanying notes 131-134 infra.
131. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
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gone through a marriage ceremony that was invalid because of a nonobvious defect, or if the father had acknowledged the child in writing
or had been decreed the child's father by a court. Finally, the child
could be entitled to benefits if he were eligible to inherit from his father
under state law.1 32 Lucas involved an unmarried couple that lived together between 1948 and 1966. During this time the couple had two
children, whom the father supported and orally acknowledged as his
own. The couple separated in 1966, and the father died two years
later. The Supreme Court held that the children were not denied
equal protection on the ground that the statute seemed closely tailored
toward assuring that all dependent children would recover benefits.
The fact that, unlike the Lucas children, a few nondependent legitimate
and even illegitimate children would also benefit was not sufficient to
invalidate the statute.
It seems unlikely that the Lucas statute involves purposeful discrimination. 33 Looking at all the situations in which Congress allocated benefits, it appears that Congress simply failed to anticipate this
situation. Normally, the Court should not correct an inadvertent omission via equal protection; rather, correction should be left to the legislative process. 134 When the group prejudiced by the omission is as
politically powerless as illegitimates, however, judicial employment of
equal protection seems appropriate. Thus, although it is a close case,
the proposed
test would probably require rejection of the Lucas
35
result. 1
A serious deficiency in the Court's development of this area of the
law has been its willingness to treat parents of illegitimate children with
the same solicitude as illegitimate children themselves.136 To be sure,
132. Id. at 497-99. After Trimble v. Gordon the provision possibly could include all children.
However, since that case involved a situation in which paternity had been adjudicated prior to the
father's death, it is possible that some illegitimate children are still ineligible to inherit from their
fathers. See 430 U.S. at 773 n.15.
133. Of course, if the discrimination were purposeful, it would be clear that the Lucas children were denied equal protection. There can be no serious question of paternity. Indeed, when
a man lives with a woman for eighteen years, during which time she has two children, his paternity seems substantially more certain than the typical situation in which a woman charges a man
with fathering her child, the man denies it, and a judge or jury finds it more likely than not that
the man was the father.
134. See text accompanying notes 266-70 infra.
135. If, contrary to the above supposition, Congress intentionally discriminated against illegitimates such as the Lucas children, there would be even less justification for the decision. By
rejecting Lucas, the proposed analysis necessarily approves of the result, if not all the reasoning,
in Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974), which invalidated discrimination even more invidious than that involved in Lucas.
136. But cf Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (Texas law placing duty on natural father to
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parents of illegitimates may share their offspring's unpopularity with
the legislature. Unlike their offspring, however, they are responsible
for their status, rendering this special solicitude inappropriate. Yet in
Glona v. American Guarantee& LiabilityInsurance Co., 137 a companion
case to Levy v. Louisiana,138 the Court invalidated a Louisiana law that
granted a wrongful death remedy to the mother of a legitimate child
killed by a tortfeasor but denied such a remedy to the mother of an
illegitimate child. The Court concluded that denying wrongful death
benefits to mothers of illegitimate children would not deter women
from having such children because "[i]t would, indeed, be farfetched to
assume that women have illegitimate children so that they can be compensated in damages for their death."' 139 The Court's reasoning is not
persuasive in that effective deterrence is hardly a sine qua non of per0
Further, the apparent purpose of the Louisiana
missible punishment. 14
statute was not deterrence but denial of rewards in the form of compensation to those whose irresponsible conduct created the child. While
Louisiana's judgment on this matter may be criticized, the equal pro-

14
tection clause should not preclude the state from making it.
42
Similarly, in New Jersey Wefare Rights Organizationv. Cahill,1

the Court invalidated a New Jersey statute that provided for assistance
to families of working poor, defined as man and wife and at least one
minor child who was either the natural child of both, the natural child
of one and adopted by the other, or a child adopted by both. The
Court concluded that illegitimate children were in fact treated less favorably than legitimate children under the statute. To be sure, unlike
the situation in Glona, illegitimate children were effectively treated less
favorably than legitimate children. This discrimination, however,
support his legitimate children but not his illegitimate children held to violate equal protection

clause). See text accompanying notes 118-20 supra.
137. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).

138. 391 U.S. 68 (1968), discussed in text accompanying notes 115-17 supra.
139. 391 U.S. at 75.
140. For example, the Constitution condones the jailing of chronic alcoholics for public
drunkenness even though we know it will not deter them. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
Indeed, we allow the execution of some murderers even though we are uncertain of its deterrent
value. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Symposium, StatisticalEvidence on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 164 (1975).
141. This is not to suggest that the government has unlimited power to treat illegitimate parents in any manner it desires. Due process applies to everyone. Consequently, a state cannot
take a bastard from his parent without a due process hearing. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972). There is a real difference, however, between taking a child without a hearing (which
cannot be done to anyone) and denying compensation for the death of a child (which could be
done to everybody if the legislature so chose).
142. 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
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seems incidental to the permissible purpose of aiding family units. 41 3
Two adults living together, married or unmarried, cannot qualify because they are not a family unit. Indeed, unlike Glona, allowing unmarried adults with children to be eligible for funding may well
encourage the production of illegitimate children. Furthermore, in
most cases, two adults living together with their illegitimate child can
marry and become eligible for family aid. To the extent that it can be
argued that illegitimates tend to live with one parent, it must be noted
that this statute also denies aid to legitimate children living with one
parent. The Court's faulty reasoning in Cahill is directly attributable
to its failure to carefully and precisely analyze the nature of the statute
that it was evaluating.
The final case in this section is Fiallo v. Bell, 44 in which the Court
upheld a federal immigration statute that gives special preference to
legitimate parents and legitimate minor children of American citizens,
and a like preference to mothers of illegitimate minor American children and children of illegitimate American mothers, but denying such
a preference to the father of an illegitimate child or the child of an
illegitimate father. Emphasizing the unusual deference due a congressional judgment in regard to immigration, the Court sustained the
statute.
The principal concern here is with the citizen who is denied the
opportunity to have his alien father or child immigrate. In this regard,
there are four potential equal protection claims: (1) illegitimate fathers
are treated less favorably than legitimate fathers; (2) illegitimate fathers
are treated less favorably than illegitimate mothers; (3) illegitimate
children of fathers are treated less favorably than legitimate children of
fathers; and (4) illegitimate children of fathers are treated less favorably than illegitimate children of mothers. In regard to all of these classifications, the potential for fraud in the father-illegitimate child
relationship is greater than in the favored relationship. Unlike inheritance or support cases in which paternal acknowledgment would rarely
be given falsely, one would expect fraudulent claims of paternity in
immigration cases where connivance is not uncommon.145 Moreover,
since conception usually occurs in a foreign country, the opportunity
for fraud is enhanced. This potential for fraud seems to be sufficient
evidence of a nondiscriminatory purpose to justify the Court's decision
143. See text accompanying notes 11-17 supra.
144. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
145. See, e.g., Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
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to uphold the statute. 146
Overall, the Court's results in cases involving illegitimacy based
discrimination are less satisfactory than those involving gender based
discrimination. The proposed test would sharpen the issues in this
area and tend to reduce the opportunity for the type of simplistic analysis employed in Gomez and Cahill. This is not to suggest that each
person applying the proposed test would necessarily reach the same
result. For example, had the Court applied the proposed test in Mathews v. Lucas, it might have reached the same result rather than that
suggested here. Nevertheless, in this area, a test that sharpens the issues is badly needed.
ALIENAGE

In some respects, aliens are analogous to a racial minority. They
are not merely underrepresented but unrepresented in the legislatures
and in Congress. Unlike blacks, women and illegitimates, they still do
not have the right to vote. Moreover, they have been and continue to
be subject to discrimination that would not be tolerated against other
groups.' 47 These factors prompted the Court to conclude that "[a]liens
minority for
as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular'
1 48
whom heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate."
This conclusion, however, is hardly irrefutable. Unlike blacks or
women, aliens are usually not visually distinguishable from the general
population. 49 More importantly, the classification is usually obtained
voluntarily and generally is not immutable. 5 0 Perhaps most significantly, differentiation between citizen and alien is specifically sanctioned by several sections of the Constitution.' 5 ' Thus, although aliens
have been subject to some hostile treatment as compared to citizens,
146. In addition, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate fathers can be sustained
on the suggested disposition of the Glona case. See text accompanying notes 137-41 supra.
Favoring illegitimate mothers over fathers is further justified by the fact that the decision to enact
this classification was made by a predominantly male Congress.
147. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Farrah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973) (holding that federal statutory
prohibition against discrimination in employment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970), did not apply
to discrimination against aliens).
148. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (citation omitted). But see Foley v.
Connelie, 98 S.Ct. 1067 (1978).
149. Sometimes, however, discrimination against aliens is thinly disguised racial discrimination. See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); cf Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (invalidating municipal ordinance on building codes that had been
applied discriminatorily against Chinese laundries).
150. Of course, some aliens were brought to this country involuntarily as babies. Also, some
aliens are ineligible to become citizens.
151. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 651-52 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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not all of this hostility can be deemed unjustifiable. It is somewhat
surprising, therefore, that the Court, which has yet to hold gender or
illegitimacy to be a suspect classification, has accorded that status to
alienage.
In fact, alienage is a hybrid in terms of suspicion. Depending
principally on which governmental body is enacting what type of law,
alienage may be an entirely appropriate classification or merely a device by which a majority can unjustifiably suppress an unrepresented
minority. Generally, the Court's decisions have recognized this dual
aspect of alienage and have evaluated the competing interests with unusual care.
Congress, of course, is principally charged with establishing rules
and conditions under which aliens may enter the country, and one
would expect the Court to exhibit substantial deference to that judgment. This is precisely what the Court did in Mathews v. Diaz152 when
it unanimously sustained a congressional statute limiting the federal
medical insurance program to aliens who had been admitted for permanent residence and had resided in the United States for five consecutive years. The Court concluded:
Since it is obvious that Congress has no constitutional duty to provide allaliens with the welfare benefits provided to citizens, the party

challenging the constitutionality of the particular line Congress has
drawn has the burden of advancing principled reasoning that will at
yet tolerate a different line separating
once invalidate that line 1and
53
some aliens from others.

Because those challenging the statute could not suggest a principled
justification for a different line, the Court refused to substitute its judgment for that of Congress even though it was willing to assume that the
congressional judgment may have been unnecessarily harsh.
The Court did not extend this deference to the Civil Service Commission in the companion case of Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,'5 4
which invalidated a regulation excluding aliens from civil service employment. In that case, after assuming arguendo that Congress or the
President could preclude aliens from public employment, the Court
noted that the Commission was neither required nor forbidden to exclude aliens. Focusing on the function of the Civil Service Commission, which has no direct responsibility for either foreign affairs in
152. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
153. Id. at 82 (emphasis added by Court).
154. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
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general or aliens in particular, the Court concluded that only one reason proffered for the discrimination was worthy of appraisal-the need
for undivided loyalty in certain sensitive positions. The Commission
argued that excluding aliens from all positions served the valid administrative purpose of eliminating the difficult task of ascertaining which
positions should be so classified. The Court rejected this argument,
holding that "[a]ny fair balancing of the public interest in avoiding the
wholesale deprivation of employment opportunities caused by the
Commission's indiscriminate policy, as opposed to what may be nothing more than a hypothetical justification, requires rejection of the argument of administrative convenience in this case."' 55 This analysis is
not far removed from the proposed test, which would conclude that the
desire to avoid classifying jobs on the basis of sensitivity is not sufficient to render it probable that the discrimination against aliens engenan incidental adjunct to this legitimate,
dered thereby was merely 156
purpose.
nondiscriminatory
In general, the states have no special power to limit aliens' rights.
Indeed, federal enactments in this area may well preempt state legislation even without the aid of the equal protection clause. 57 Thus, insofar as state legislation is concerned, the Court should not sustain those
statutest5 8that appear to be principally designed to discriminate against
aliens.
Graham v. Richardson159 involved severe state limitations on
aliens' eligibility for welfare benefits. The Court, noting that these requirements were more severe than those provided by Congress, concluded that they were preempted by Congress and contravened the
equal protection clause. The states argued that they had a legitimate
interest in preserving scarce resources for their citizens. The Court
resident aliens, like citizens,
found this argument unpersuasive because
60
contributed taxes to the state treasury.
155. Id. at 115-16.
156. Indeed, there is good reason to believe from the history of this Civil Service classification

that its principal purpose was to favor citizens over aliens. Although the district court suggested

that this might be a legitimate purpose, the Commission chose not to argue it. Id. at 104 n.24.
157. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). The preemption is not universal,
however. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976); text accompanying notes 165-69 infra.

158. Of course, if the discrimination is supported by the Constitution, e.g., predicating the
right to vote upon citizenship, the statute may be upheld.

159. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
160. Indeed, Mrs. Richardson had been a taxpaying alien for 13 years, but was ineligible for
benefits because of Arizona's staggering 15 year residency requirement. Accord, Nyquist v.
Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977). Nyquist, which involved financial aid to college students, differed

from Graham in that only those aliens who chose not to become naturalized citizens at the earliest
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Sugarman v. Dougall,'6 t which invalidated a New York law denying certain state government jobs to aliens, is not significantly different
from Graham. The argument that the scarce resource of government
jobs ought to be available only to citizens is substantially the same
"put-the-alien-in-his-place" reasoning rejected in Graham. The contention that aliens would tend to leave the job sooner than citizens,
thereby necessitating additional training of replacements, is not sufficiently convincing to render it probable that the explicit discrimination
against aliens is merely an incidental adjunct to a legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose. As the Court noted, long-term resident aliens
may be a better risk than American citizens who have only recently
moved to New York.
New York's most powerful argument was the need to limit government policymaking to citizens. The difficulty with this argument is
that the statute was not so directed. Indeed, as the Court noted, it
applied to the" 'sanitation man, class B,' "but not "to persons holding
elective and high appointive offices."' 62 Justice Rehnquist, in dissent,

made a fairly persuasive case for the proposition that the power to
make administrative decisions of the kind made by appellee Dougall as
an administrative assistant in the Staff Development Unit of the Manpower Career and Development Agency can appropriately be limited
to citizens.163 It is indeed possible that a careful judgment to exclude
aliens from certain types of governmental service, perhaps even including Mr. Dougall's position, would be sustained. 164 The discrimination
under such a statute might well be merely an incidental adjunct of a
legitimate legislative purpose. However, no such benevolent purpose
possible moment were ineligible to compete for financial aid. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist, would have distinguished Graham and upheld the classification

on the ground that any person who desired financial aid could have become eligible for it by
declaring his intention to become a citizen as soon as possible. Thus, nobody in the disfavored
group was powerless to remove himself from it. The Court, however, noting that "[r]esident

aliens are obligated to pay their full share of the taxes that support the assistance programs," id. at
12, invalidated the classification. The Court reached the better result. Although lack of immuta-

bility is a factor in determining when a group is sufficiently analogous politically to a racial minority to distrust legislative action discriminating against it, that is not the only factor. Surely, a
statute in a predominantly Baptist state that provided financial aid to all Baptists or those who

agreed to become Baptists as soon as that church would accept them would be suspect (even
absent the first amendment). Similar suspicion should be accorded a judgment of the New York

legislature denying benefits to a taxpaying resident of New York on the ground that he wished to
be loyal
161.
162.
163.
662.
164.

to France or Canada.
413 U.S. 634 (1973).
Id. at 643 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
These decisions included "allocating funds, hiring [and] dealing with personnel." Id. at
A possibility explicitly left open by the Court.

Id. at 646-47.
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could be accorded the broadside discrimination mandated by the actual
New York statute.
The most difficult of the alien discrimination cases is In re
Grffths,'65 in which the Court invalidated a rule of the Connecticut
Superior Court denying bar admission to aliens. The case is difficult
because in some respects a lawyer is analogous to a government official,
particularly in Connecticut, where, as the Court noted, every lawyer is
a "commissioner of the Superior Court" with the power to "'sign writs
and subpoenas, take recognizances, administer oaths and take depositions and acknowledgement of deeds.' In the exercise of this authority,
command the assistance of a county sheriff
a Connecticut lawyer may
66
or a town constable."'1
Although the question is excruciatingly close, the proposed test
would probably require that the superior court's rule be upheld. The
work of an attorney is different from other occupations or even other
professions. "Attorneys are the means through which the majority of
the people seek redress for their grievances, enforcement and defense of
their rights and compensation for their injuries and losses."' 167 While
these functions may not be exactly governmental, they are much closer
to being so than those performed by a beautician or even a physician.
Surely, Connecticut could demand that its judges be United States citizens; attorneys, though not employed by the state, also play a significant role in the judicial process.
This is not to say that the republic would crumble by permitting
aliens to practice law-they have practiced in the past, in some cases
undoubtedly quite well.' 68 By the same token, however, some aliens
would make effective United States senators and representatives if they
were permitted to serve; yet, despite the inherent check of the voting
populace, which would be unlikely to elect any but the most superior
aliens, the Constitution explicitly forbids us to make this choice. All of
165. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
166. Id. at 723 (quoting CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 51-85, 52-90 (1975)). Mrs. Griffiths argued
that since Connecticut statutes also require citizenship for other occupations, such as hairdressers
and cosmeticians, id. at 722 n.12, the state's real purpose was to bar aliens from more than just the
practice of law. Nevertheless, since the superior court's rule was separate from the other statutes,
it was proper for the Court to limit its consideration to the citizen/alien classification as it related
to the practice of law. In fact, the Court never decided whether its consideration should be so
confined since it would have invalidated the statute either way. Id.
167. In re Griffiths, 162 Conn. 249, 262, 294 A.2d 281, 287 (1972), rev'd,413 U.S. 717 (1973).
168. "Certainly many prominent and distinguished lawyers have been admitted to practice,
both in the State and Federal Courts, who were not citizens of the United States or of any State."
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1872), quoted in In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 719.
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which leads to the conclusion that while Connecticut's interest in ex-

cluding aliens from the legal profession may not be compelling, it is
sufficiently substantial to render it probable that the discrimination
against aliens was merely an incidental adjunct to a legitimate administrative purpose. 9
Foley v. Connelie,'7 ° which upheld a New York statute requiring
its policemen to be citizens, involved a problem analytically similar to
Grjiths. Although deciding the case contrary to Grfiths, the Court
made no serious effort to distinguish the cases.' 7 ' Foley is distinguish-

able in that a citizen can choose the lawyer with whom he would like
contact whereas he has no choice in regard to the policeman with

whom he may be confronted. While the distinction is perhaps one of
degree, such distinctions are not unheard of in constitutional adjudication. In any event, the analysis under the proposed test, which rejected
Grffiths, would for the same reasons accept Foley.
RESIDENCY

Normally, statutes that discriminate on the basis of residency present no serious equal protection problem. Many governmental services

such as public schools and welfare payments are intended for residents
only, and denying a nonresident these services does not relegate him to

an inferior status but simply requires him to obtain them from the state
or locality in which he chooses to reside.' 72 A different question is
presented when nonresidents are treated less favorably than residents

with regard to matters in which they are similarly situated. For example, a state statute that imposes a tax on a nonresident's property with-

out imposing a similar tax on a resident's property has been held to

169. I am somewhat concerned that I, as a lawyer, may be biased in regard to the relative
importance of attorneys. The fact that Mr. Justice Powell, certainly no slouch in regard to defending the integrity of the profession, see Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 389 (1977)
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), wrote Griffiths does nothing to alleviate my
concern. Nevertheless, although recognizing that reasonable people can differ, the judgment expressed in text accompanying this note seems correct.
170. 98 S. Ct. 1067 (1978).
171. This point did not go unnoticed by Justice Marshall, id. at 1076 (dissenting opinion), or
by Justice Stevens, id. at 1077, 1079 (dissenting opinion).
172. This does not permit a state to deny nonresidents use of those facilities necessary to
effectuate constitutional rights. States are required to permit nonresidents to use their highways
for interstate travel, Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868); cf. United States v. Guest,
383 U.S. 745 (1966) (Constitution prohibits criminal conspiracies directed against right to interstate travel), and for the interchange of ideas, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (state cannot impose criminal punishment on person for distributing religious literature in a company
owned town). See also Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
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violate equal protection. 73 The best justification for this result is that
mercy of the legislanonresidents, being politically impotent, are at the
74
residents.'
the
represents
course,
of
ture, which,
In recent years, however, length-of-residency requirements have
been far more significant than residency requirements. The Court has
found several length-of-residency requirements violative of equal protection because of their interference with the fundamental right to
travel. 7 This analysis is unsatisfactory because any requirement that
really does interfere with the constitutional right to travel would be
unconstitutional for that reason alone, without regard to equal
protection. 176
Beyond this, if the Court were really concerned with the right to
travel, it surely would have invalidated the residency requirement that
it upheld in McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commision.17 7
Francis McCarthy, a Philadelphia fireman with sixteen years service,
lived with his wife and their ten children in their Philadelphia home
until several acts of gang vandalism of his home and beatings of his
children caused his wife and nine of their children to move to their
summer home in New Jersey. McCarthy and his oldest son continued
to live in their Philadelphia home for an additional ten months until
the repeated acts of vandalism forced him to sell the house and move to
his mother's house in Philadelphia. For the next few months he spent
two nights a week at the fire station, two to three nights at his mother's
house, and the remaining time, when he had days off, with his wife and
family in their New Jersey home. Although he retained substantial
indicia of residence at his mother's home,' 7 8 the Pennsylvania court
173. WHYY, Inc. v. Borough of Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117 (1968).

But f. Baldwin v. Fish &

Game Comm'n, 98 S. Ct. 1852 (1978) (upholding favored treatment for residents in purchase of
hunting licenses).
174. wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949).

Although the Court has not

articulated this rationale as the basis of its decisions, it has upheld similar discrimination against

residents, who can complain to the legislature if they are dissatisfied, and, indeed, vote the legislators out of office. See Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); see especially the opinion of
Mr. Justice Brennan, id. at 533 (concurring opinion). Cf. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 98 S. Ct. 2482 (1978)

(invalidating Alaska statute requiring certain private employers to favor Alaska residents in regard to employment).
175.

See notes 185-87 and accompanying text infra.

176. whether length-of-residency requirements are unconstitutional for that reason is beyond

the scope of this article. CopareShapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 663-77 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting), with Barrett, JudicialSupervision of Legislative Classiffcations-A More Modest Role
for EqualProtection?,1976 B.Y.U.L. Rav. 89, 116-20. See also Califano v. Gautier Torres, 98 S.
Ct. 906 (1978) (holding that right to travel did not require that federal government provide bene-

fits to new resident of Puerto Rico comparable to those he enjoyed as a resident of Connecticut).
177. 424 U.S. 645 (1976).
178. Appellant lived at this address on his duty days; had his own room there, paid rent in
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held that the time spent with his wife and family in New Jersey
rendered him a nonresident and therefore ineligible to remain a
fireman. 7 9 It seems beyond dispute that the Philadelphia residency re-

quirement penalized McCarthy's fundamental right to travel (not to
mention his right to associate with his family) far more than any of the
length-of-residency provisions invalidated by the Supreme Court in
other cases.'

Yet, the Court found the constitutionality of the resi-

dency requirement to be so clear that it did not even schedule the case
for argument.
The real difference between McCarthy and the length-of-residency

cases has nothing to do with the right to travel. Rather, it is that the
former involved discrimination against nonresidents while the latter in-

volved discrimination against newly arrived residents. Newcomers are
a much more "discrete and insular" group than nonresidents in that
they are first-class citizens in neither the state from which nor the state
to which they have migrated. To be sure, one becomes a newcomer by
choice, the status is not immutable, and as a newcomer one is not high-

ly visible. Nevertheless, discrimination against newcomers has been
fairly pervasive, 8 ' and some of the impetus for it, like that for discrimination against aliens, comes from the feeling that "we are better than
they.'

82

The political process is unavailable to correct this discrimina-

tion, since by the time an erstwhile newcomer acquires sufficient clout
to influence political decisions, he is no longer a newcomer.' 3 Therefore, newcomers are sufficiently analogous politically to a racial minority that a legislative or administrative decision against them should be
distrusted.

184

kind by purchasing the household groceries and performing maintenance upkeep; was
registered to vote at this address; received mail and his telephone was listed at this address; his auto was registered there as was his driver's license; he maintained his checking
and savings account at a local branch; and attended church within five blocks of [this
address].
McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 19 Pa. Commw. Ct. 383, 386, 339 A.2d 634, 637-38
(1975) (Crumlish, J., dissenting), aft'd, 424 U.S. 645 (1976).
179. McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comra'n, 19 Pa. Commnw. Ct. 383, 339 A.2d 634
(1975), af'd,424 U.S. 645 (1976).
180. See notes 185-87 and accompanying text infra.
181. For example, at one time or another newcomers have been subject to the following types
of discrimination: "waiting-period or residence requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish, and so
forth." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 n.21 (1969).
182. These are Professor Ely's terms. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
183. Indeed, one of the newcomers' complaints has been the denial of the franchise.
184. Accord, McCoy, Recent Equal Protection Decisions-FundamentalRight to Travel or
"Newcomers" as a Suspect Classg 28 VAND. L. REV. 987, 1016-23 (1975).
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On the whole, the Court's results, if not its reasoning, in this area
have been satisfactory. It rightly invalidated one-year residency
18 7
requirements for welfare payments, 85 voting,"8 6 and health care.
In none of those cases was there sufficient evidence of a nondiscriminatory purpose to render it probable that the discrimination against
newcomers was merely an incidental adjunct to a legitimate purpose.
On the other hand, the Court has approved a one-year residency requirement for in-state tuition payment at a state university. 188 Although under the proposed test this question is close, the Court was
again probably correct. A high percentage of out-of-state students do
not in fact intend to become permanent residents, but when the prize is
a substantial tuition saving, it is not difficult for such a student to cloak
himself with the trappings of a domiciliary. 189 This unusual combination of circumstances is probably, though barely, sufficient evidence of
a nondiscriminatory purpose to sustain a one-year length-of-residency
requirement. 190
The final case in this area is Sosna v. Iowa,'9 ' in which the Court
upheld a one-year residency requirement for persons seeking a divorce
from a spouse who also was not a resident of the state. Mr. and Mrs.
Sosna lived together as husband and wife in New York from 1967 to
1971. At that point, they separated, and in 1972, Mrs. Sosna moved to
Iowa. Three months later, she filed for divorce in an Iowa court, but
because her husband was not a resident of Iowa and she had not yet
lived there for a year, the Iowa court lacked statutory jurisdiction to
grant the divorce.
Under Williams v. North Carolina, 92 the Constitution would have
permitted Iowa, as the domicile of the plaintiff, to grant a divorce binding in all jurisdictions, including New York. However, as Justice Jackson's dissent in Williams established, not all aspects of justice or logic
point to this conclusion.' 93 New York, as both the domicile of the
185. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
186. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
187. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
188. Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
189. For example, an aspiring domiciliary can register to vote, obtain a driver's license, and if
rich enough, purchase a home. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,464-65 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
190. But no more than that. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
191. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
192. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
193. Id. at 311-24 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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defendant and the marital domicile, had a substantial interest in the
status of the Sosnas' marriage. Thus, Iowa's one-year residency
requirement can, and probably should, be analyzed as a laudatory effort to respect its sister states' interest in the marriages of their domiciliaries.' 94 So viewed, this requirement is hardly an effort to put a
newcomer in her place, but rather is an attempt to give fair treatment to
nonresidents, the paradigmatic opposite of a suspect classification.
Surely, Iowa could fairly conclude that its interest in a marriage in
which the defendant lived in another state was not sufficient to warrant
its dissolving the marriage at the behest of the plaintiff until such time
as he or she lived in the state for a year.1 95
Sosna provides a good illustration of the utility of the proposed
test. Iowa's interests may not be "compelling" in the sense that this
term is sometimes used. However, objectively analyzed, the primary
purpose of the statute appears to be nondiscriminatory. Since the resulting discrimination against Mrs. Sosna vis-a-vis a long-term resident
of Iowa is merely an incidental adjunct to this legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose, the Court rightly upheld the statute.
WEALTH

Cases involving discrimination on the basis of wealth can be classified as direct and indirect. Charges of indirect discrimination are
based upon the law's failure to alleviate a poor person's inability to
make a needed payment. Most of the cases fall into this category.
Much of the impetus for the proposition that indirect discrimination against the poor may constitute invidious discrimination is attributable to Anatole France's sardonic quip: "'The law, in its majestic
equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to
beg in the streets, and to steal bread.' "196 The difficulty with seeking
194. Furthermore, if Iowa were to conclude incorrectly that based on her short-term residency
Mrs. Sosna became a domiciliary entitled to a divorce, it would be penalized in that no other state
would be bound to give its decree full faith and credit. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S.
226 (1945).
195. This purpose is underscored by the provision of the statute that eliminates the length-ofresidency requirement when the defendant is also a resident of Iowa. In that situation there is no
sister state or nonresident to protect with the requirement; hence, the requirement is removed.
Indeed, in the case at bar, Mrs. Sosna was not even deprived of her right to obtain a divorce. She
could, and in fact did, obtain a divorce in New York, thereby satisfying her needs, New York's
interest, and Mr. Sosna's right to procedural fairness.
196. J. CouRNos, A MODERN PLUTARCH 27 (1928), quotedin Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
23 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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too much mileage from this bon mot is that it is almost impossible to
limit in a principled way, for unless the state is forbidden to charge for
its services, it necessarily will indirectly favor the rich. Indeed, the
Constitution does not forbid punishing one for sleeping under bridges,
begging in the street, and stealing bread. 197
The first and prototypal case of indirect discrimination against the
poor in the criminal context was Grgin v. Illinois,19 in which the Court
invalidated on equal protection grounds1 99 a requirement that al persons, including indigents, purchase a transcript as a condition of most
appeals. 2" The heart of the opinion was the seductively attractive but
deceptively simple observation: "There can be no equal justice where
the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he
has." 20 1 The deceptive simplicity lies in the fact that, platitudes to the
contrary, money can make a difference in so many ways that the kind
of trial a man gets really does depend on the amount of money he
has.2°2 The Court recognized this in Ross v. Moffitt,2 °3 when it held:
The duty of the State under our cases is not to duplicate the legal
arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a

continuing effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the in-

his claims fairly
digent defendant an adequate opportunity to present
2 4

in the context of the State's appellate process. 0
Once it is recognized that basic fairness rather than basic equality is the
aim of the Grffin line of cases, due process seems more appropriate
than equal protection as a mode of analysis. Due process grounds
were certainly available in Grin, and under the Court's usual standard for ascertaining the components of due process, the right to appeal
197. On the other hand, a poor person may not be likely to receive a substantial prison term
for a first offense that she commits in the presence of those who kidnapped her, as did Patricia
Hearst. There is a good chance that absent her wealth and notoriety, the mitigating circumstances
of her case would have prompted a significantly less severe sentence. See Blake, Justice: Is It
Partial to the Wealthy?, L.A. Times, June 2, 1977, at -, col. -.
198. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
199. The Court employed both due process and equal protection terminology, but its rationale was almost exclusively equal protection.
200. Free transcripts were available to indigents in capital cases and cases involving constitutional questions. 351 U.S. at 14-15.
201. Id. at 19.
202. E.g., a rich person can hire unlimited investigators. Of course, money isn't always helpful. See note 197 supra.
203. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
204. Id. at 616.
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should have been included."' Thus far, however, the Court has steadfastly refused to do so.2"6
Even if equal protection were an appropriate basis for invalidating
criminal procedures that indirectly discriminate against the poor, it is
most assuredly inappropriate when noncriminal statutes effectuate such
discrimination. 20 7 If the rule were otherwise, a welfare recipient could
argue that any program that did not provide a benefit that a wealthy
person could obtain was unconstitutional. For example, in Maher v.
Roe,2"' plaintiff contended that Connecticut's decision to limit state
medicaid payments to medically necessary abortions denied equal protection to an indigent desiring an elective abortion. The Court emphatically rejected this argument, observing that
[i]n a sense, every denial of welfare to an indigent creates a wealth
classification as compared to nonindigents who are able to pay for
the desired goods or services. But this Court has never held that
financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal
protection analysis.20 9
To be sure, the right to an abortion is constitutionally protected, however dubious the decision declaring it so may have been. 210 The right to
travel, however, is also constitutionally protected, 21 1 yet no one would
seriously contend that a poor person is denied equal protection by a
welfare department's decision not to finance a vacation.
Plaintiff's claim in San Antonio Independent School District v.
205. Although the right to appeal a conviction for a serious offense has not always been recognized, it is recognized today by all states of the Union. Such recognition is not surprising in view
of its importance. Prejudicial errors are frequently discovered on appeal. Thus, the appellate
process, like the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, stands as a bulwark against the ultimate horror of the criminal law, conviction of an
innocent man. To allow this bulwark against an unjust conviction to be removed would certainly
seem to be "a denial of fundamental fairness shocking to the universal sense of justice," Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), and therefore violative of due process.
206. See, e.g., Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534 (1975). Nevertheless, due process would
seem to require access to all procedural safeguards provided by the state as part of its guilt-determining process, whether or not the Constitution mandates them for all defendants. For example,
when Griffin was decided, the right to a jury trial was not applicable to the states. Maxwell v.
Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900), overruled 12years after Griffin by Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968). Yet, if a state were to provide for jury trial as a means of determining guilt or innocence,
but deny such a right to those unable to pay for it, a person denied the right to a jury trial would
be denied due process. This would seem to follow a fortiori from Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371 (1971), which held that due process was denied by a rule conditioning access to a civil court
for the purpose of obtaining a divorce on the payment of a fee. But cf.United States v. Kras, 409
U.S. 434 (1973) (bankruptcy fee provisions do not constitute denial of equal protection).
207. Arguably a criminal proceeding is sui generis because it is initiated by the state.
208. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
209. Id. at 471.
210. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Loewy, supra note 4; Ely, supra note 3.
211. E.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
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Rodriguez,21 u in which the Court upheld local financing of public education, was not significantly stronger. The claim that people living in
poor districts are treated less favorably than those living in wealthier
districts is saying little more than that the rich can buy more than the
poor. This analysis is equally applicable to the claim that those who
live in richer districts can get a better education for their children while
paying taxes at a lower rate. This is analogous to the obvious fact that
a millionaire can buy a Cadillac for a smaller percentage of his wealth
than most of the rest of us would spend on a Volkswagen. Furthermore, the class indirectly discriminated against is not even made up of
poor individuals, but rather individuals living in a community with relatively little taxable wealth who may or may not be relatively poor
themselves.21 3 Thus, the Court correctly concluded that
[t]he system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have
none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled
with such disabilities or subject to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process.214
Direct discrimination on the basis of wealth is a different matter.
Mr. Justice Harlan, a staunch opponent of equal protection analysis in
cases involving indirect discrimination against the poor, said: "The
States, of course, are prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause from
discriminating between 'rich' and 'poor' as such in the formulation and
application of their laws." 215 Some years earlier, Justice Jackson, with
characteristic clarity and elegance, opined: "'Indigence' in itself is
neither a source of rights nor a basis for denying them. The mere state
of being without funds is a neutral fact--constitutionally an irrele'216
vance, like race, creed, or color.
In many ways the poor are analogous politically to a racial minor212. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
213. See Note, A StalisticalAnalysisofthe School FinanceDecision: On Winning Battles and
Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303, 1328-29 (1972).

214. 411 U.S. at 28.
215. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

216. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-85 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring). These
observations are somewhat overstated since in many cases indigence is a source of rights-the rich
do not get free transcripts, welfare checks, or free abortions even when medically necessary. But
because the obvious purpose of statutes providing these benefits is to ensure access to minimal
standards, it is certainly not invidious to limit the benefits to those who otherwise would not have
access to them.
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ity: they have suffered a long history of discrimination, dating back at

least to the Articles of Confederation, which denied paupers the privileges and immunities granted other citizens;2" 7 the Supreme Court itself

once characterized the poor as a "moral pestilence";2 18 and, even today,
much effort is expended on keeping the poor in their place, that is,

somebody else's neighborhood. 219 Although the poor are not highly visible in the sense that blacks and women are (except perhaps for the
very poor) and their status is not immutable (although many who were
born and raised in abject poverty are less certain of their power over
change than was Horatio Alger), the analogy to a racial minority is
sufficiently close to require objective evidence of a nondiscriminatory

purpose sufficient to justify any law that directly discriminates against
them.22 0
Perhaps the clearest illustration of unjustifiable discrimination

against indigents is Edwards v. Calpfornia,2 2 in which the Court invalidated a California statute punishing any person who brought a nonresident indigent into the state. The purpose of the statute was obvious,
and, as the Court noted, "the indigent non-residents who are the real
victims of the statute are deprived of the opportunity to exert political
pressure upon the California legislature in order to obtain a change in
' Although the Court employed other grounds to invalidate
policy."222

the provision,22 it seems clear that the statute also violated equal protection.
More recently, California's efforts to discriminate against the poor
217. The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the
people of the different states in this union, the free inhabitants of each of these states,
paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from Justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of free citizens in the several states; and the people of each state shall
have free ingress and regress to and from any other state ....
Articles of Confederation, art. 4.
218. Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (I1 Peters) 102, 142 (1837).
219. See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), discussed in text accompanying notes
224-30 infra; cf Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding zoning ordinance
restricting number of unrelated persons permitted to live in one house), discussed in text
accompanying notes 11-17 supra. See also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
220. See generall, M. HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA 14-17 (1969).
221. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
222. Id. at 174.
223. The Court relied on the commerce clause, id. at 177, the concurring opinions on privilege and immunities, id. at 181 (Douglas, J., concurring), 186 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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have become more sophisticated and more successful. Specifically, in
James v. Valtierra224 the Court upheld a California constitutional provision prohibiting the construction of low income housing until a majority of the voters of the community had approved the project in a
referendum, thereby rendering it possible for a community desirous of
minimizing its number of poor citizens to do so by substantially reducing their housing opportunities.
Of course, the poor have no right as such to multi-family housing
developments. A community may, if it wishes, zone itself for exclusively single family housing notwithstanding the resulting diminution
of the number of poor and/or blacks who will be able to live there. 25
James was different, however, in that only housing for the poor was
subject to a mandatory referendum. As Mr. Justice Marshall put it in
dissent: "Publicly assisted housing developments designed to accommodate the aged, veterans, state employees, persons of moderate income, or any class of citizens other than the poor, need not be approved
by prior referenda. ' ' 226 Thus, the mandatory referendum provision does
directly discriminate against the poor.
Such discrimination should be unconstitutional unless there is objective evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose sufficient to
render it probable that the discrimination was merely an incidental adjunct of the legitimate, nondiscriminatory purpose. The only plausible
nondiscriminatory justification for this provision is that the communities involved must waive taxes and provide services to low income
housing. 27 On balance, this does not seem sufficient to justify the discrimination. Low income housing is hardly unique in receiving services without paying taxes,22 8 and even if it could be considered sui
generis because of its size, number of locations, or other attributes, it
would be difficult to conclude that the discrimination engendered
thereby is merely an incidental adjunct to a legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose. Given the history of discrimination against the poor in
224. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
225. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); cf.Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (validating zoning ordinance restrict-

ing number of unrelated persons permitted to live in one house), discussed in text accompanying
notes 11-17 supra.

226. 402 U.S. at 144.
227. Id. at 143 n.4.
228. See, e.g., CAL. MIL.& VET. CODE §§ 1120-1121 (1954).
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the nation in general and in230
California in particular,22 9 more justification should be forthcoming.
The final case for consideration in this section is Harperv. Virginia
State Board ofElections,231 which invalidated payment of a poll tax as
a condition of voting.2 32 Payment of a poll tax as a condition of voting
can be analyzed as a hybrid between direct and indirect discrimination

against the poor. Inasmuch as the poor are not denied the vote per se,
but merely denied it if they cannot or do not pay the tax, the discrimination appears to be indirect. Unlike the cost of a transcript, however,
which is used to pay for the actual printing, the poll tax is not used to
finance the election-rather, like other taxes, it is used to finance state

services.233 Thus, an indigent is not denied the right to vote simply
because of his inability to pay the cost of that service, but because of his
inability to pay one of the most regressive taxes ever devised.2 34

Conceivably, it would be permissible to condition some privileges,
such as the issuance of a driver's license, upon the payment of a poll
tax, inasmuch as the poor would at least have the opportunity to exert
235
their influence on the legislature in an effort to change the law.
When, however, the very right to influence the legislature is conditioned on ability to pay the tax, the discrimination is especially invidi-

ous. The state's principal justification for the law, other than a desire
to disenfranchise the poor,2 36 was to facilitate collection of the poll tax.
229. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), discussed in text accompanying
notes 221-23 supra.
230. To be sure, unless the referendum procedure is applied to all legislation, some groups
will be treated less favorably than others. This inequality of treatment only becomes suspicious,
however, when the group treated less favorably is so "discrete and insular" that it was once a
crime to bring one of its members into the state.
231. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
232. Despite its name, the poll tax is merely a head tax, and not a tax on voting. Conditioning the vote on its payment is merely a means of enforcement. Each person must pay the tax
whether he votes or not.
233. In Virginia, public schools received one dollar of the tax and the other fifty cents was for
general expenditures. 383 U.S. at 664 n.l.
234. It is doubtful that any responsible political theorist supports the poll or head tax as a fair
means of allocating the cost of government. Even Senator Goldwater, one of the staunchest opponents of progressive taxation, contends that taxation in proportion to wealth is the only fair
method of allocating the tax burden. B. GOLDWATER, CONSCIENCE OF A CONSERVATIVE 61
(1960). While this does not suggest that the poll tax is unconstitutional, it does cause one to look
askance at a law that denies privileges to those who cannot pay.
235. See, e.g., Law of Aug. 28, 1957, ch.121, § 2, 1957 Maine Laws 78 (formerly codified at
ME. REv. STAT. tit. 29, § 584 (1964)) (repealed 1973), cited in 383 U.S. at 668 n.5.
236. It is also arguable, indeed it was probably accepted as sound political theory by a
large percentage of Americans through most of our history, that people with property
have a deeper stake in community affairs, and are consequently more responsible, more
educated, more knowledgeable, more worthy of confidence, than those without means,
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In view of the history of the poll tax as a device to disenfranchise the
poor,237 coupled with the insignificance of the revenue collected from it
relative to other taxes, 238 this justification does not seem sufficient to
render it probable that the discrimination against the indigent occasioned thereby was merely an incidental adjunct to a legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose.
VOTING AND REPRESENTATION

Some laws that deny the right to vote can be invalidated on the
ground that they discriminate against groups that are sufficiently analogous to racial minorities to distrust legislative judgments against them.
Thus, the poor in Harper and the newcomers in Dunn v. Blumstein2 39
were properly accorded the right to vote under the equal protection
clause. Other limitations on the franchise such as age, citizenship and
residency are clearly permissible. Still others do not discriminate
against groups similar to racial minorities, but are arguably
unjustifiable; such limitations should be analyzed under some clause
other than equal protection.
For example, in Harper, the Supreme Court invalidated payment
of the poll tax as a condition of voting for all citizens, not merely for
those too poor to pay the tax. There would seem to be no equal protection reason to invalidate a classification discriminating between
those who pay their taxes and those who wilfully fail to do so. The
latter group may be unpopular (as indeed tax delinquents and
criminals should be), but they are hardly analogous to a racial minority. The fact that equal protection does not require equality between
taxpayer and wilful tax delinquent does not necessarily mean, however,
that the latter can be denied the right to vote, for it is possible to conclude as the Court did in Harper that "the right to vote is too precious,
too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned." a 0 But such a conclusion is essentially premised on due process considerations.2 4'
Similarly, the Court incorrectly relied on equal protection in
and that the community and the nation would be better managed if the franchise were

restricted to such citizens.
383 U.S. at 685 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 684-85. Perhaps the tax served also to disenfranchise blacks. United States v.
Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234, 245 (W.D. Tex. 1966).
238. United States v. Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234, 253 (W.D. Tex. 1966).
239. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). See note 186 and accompanying text supra.
240. 383 U.S. at 670.
241. One can argue with some persuasiveness that the right to vote is protected by due process. One can also argue that it is protected by the privileges and immunities clause, the ninth
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Kramer v. Union Free School District,242 in which it invalidated a New
York statute providing that the school board in certain districts was to
be elected by qualified voters who either owned or leased taxable real
property in the district, were married to one who owned or leased such
property, or had a child enrolled in one of the schools. Kramer, a

bachelor stockbroker who lived in his parents' home and therefore
failed to meet any of the school board voting requirements, represented
a class that clearly was not analogous to a racial minority. Indeed,
unlike the situation in Harper in which those barred from voting also
lost their influence with the legislative body that barred them, Kramer
and those similarly situated were able to vote in elections for the state

legislature and thereby influence legislators to change the school board
voting requirement. u43 Hence, there is no basis for Kramer's claim that

he was denied equal protection. This is not to say that Kramer was
wrongly decided. In view of the fundamental nature of the franchise,

one might well contend that New York's interest was not sufficient to
deprive Kramer of it. Once again, however, equal protection should
244
have nothing to do with the resolution of the question.

Legislative apportionment is another matter. Here, the underrepresented citizens are claiming that they are treated less favorably
amendment, or the republican form of government clause. The conclusion in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875), that it is not so protected is certainly subject to reevaluation in
light of modem insights. The right is certainly fundamental in the literal sense of being preservative of all other rights. Indeed, it is doubtful that any other right not explicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution is as universally regarded as fundamental to a free society as the right to vote. One
would certainly be hard-pressed to explain why the right to an abortion is implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty, but the right to vote is not. See Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding the
right to an abortion to be protected by the due process clause). To be sure, the right to vote can
be conditioned on age, citizenship and residency, whereas the right to an abortion cannot. See
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). These and perhaps other qualifications,
however, are necessary to protect the state's compelling interest in assuring requisite voter maturity, loyalty, and interest. In this regard, they serve the same function as trimesters serve in determining when the right to abortion can be limited. Whether the Court rightly concluded that
wilful nonpayment of a poll tax cannot disqualify a voter is debatable. By wilfully refusing to
pay a tax he can afford, a citizen shows sufficient contempt for his government that he can be said
to have opted for second-class citizenship. Indeed, he may well have subjected himself to a criminal conviction that could possibly result in his permanent disenfranchisement. Cf. Richardson v.
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (state law disenfranchising convicted felons does not violate the equal
protection clause). However that question may be resolved, it has nothing to do with equal protection.
242. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
243. See id. at 639 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Lee, Mr. Herbert Spencerand the BachelorStockbroker: Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 15 ARiz. L. REv. 458, 463-64 (1973).
244. The same is true in regard to the right to place a candidate's name on the ballot. The
Court held in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), that this is a form of political association
protected by the first amendment. As Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion noted, it is therefore "unnecessary to draw upon the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 42.
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than their counterparts who enjoy greater representation. At first
glance, an underrepresented citizen does not appear to be analogous to
a member of a racial minority because he is not visually identifiable,
subject to pervasive discrimination, or, contrary to Chief Justice Warren's analysis, "that much less a citizen. 245 In one crucial respect, however, he is politically analogous to a member of a racial minority-he
has a disproportionately small voice in the legislature. The problem,
of course, does not always lend itself to a legislative solution. If, for
example, twenty percent of the population controls fifty-five percent of
the state senate, it is entirely conceivable that in every session a reapportionment bill would pass the house and be defeated 55-45 in the
senate. Consequently, Baker v. Carr246 was clearly correct in holding
that a claim of malapportionment is cognizable under the equal protection clause. In addition, there is an exceptionally strong policy reason
for requiring the legislature to be substantially representative, since
"[t]he presumption of constitutionality. . . [is] based on an assumption
that the institutions of state government are structured so as to
represent fairly all the people." 247 Thus, a little judicial activism in
preventing unfair representation justifies substantial judicial deference
to the legislatures in most other cases.24 8
The next question concerns the constitutional standard an apportionment scheme should be required to meet. The 1964 reapportionment cases held "that the Equal Protection Clause requires that a State
make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both
houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable."2 49 Mr. Justice Stewart suggested that "the plan must be a rational one . . . [and] must be such as not to permit the systematic
250
frustration of the will of a majority of the electorate of the State.
245. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964).

"I find it impossible to understand how or

why a voter in California, for instance, either feels or is less a citizen than a voter in Nevada,
simply because, despite their population disparities, each of those States is represented by two
United States Senators." Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 746 (1964) (Stewart,

J., dissenting).
246. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

247. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969), discussedin text accompanying
note 242 supra. The statement was less appropriate in Kramer than it is in explaining the reapportionment decisions. See Lee, supra note 243, at 463.
248. Of course, this deference does not apply when the Constitution has determined that a
temporary majority should not rule, e.g., when freedom of speech is abridged. Neither should it

apply to those laws that treat racial minorities, or groups politically analogous to them, less favorably than the remainder of the population.

249. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964).
250. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 753-54 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissent-
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Justice Stewart's approach is better than that taken by the Court, for if
a minority cannot systematically frustrate the majority, the rationale
for treating the underrepresented majority as a "discrete and insular"
group vanishes. The proposed test would modify Justice Stewart's test
by also invalidating those apportionment schemes that substantially
disadvantage minorities-for example, a scheme in which sixty percent
of the population controlled ninety percent of the legislature. When a
legislative apportionment scheme does not significantly diminish the
voting power of a definable group in the legislature, however, the
scheme should be upheld. In Mahan v. Howell,25 ' the Court, while
purporting to adhere to the 1964 cases, permitted a sixteen percent
deviation between the most over- and underrepresented districts in order to maintain a certain degree of integrity in Virginia's political subdivisions. By allowing this degree of flexibility, but not allowing the
kind of apportionment whereby discernible groups or areas are seriously underrepresented, the Court appears to be adopting a basically
sound approach.
RATIONALITY

A recent Yale Law Journal Note contended that the concept of
rationality in regard to equal protection is illusory.252 The author correctly concluded that all classifications are rationally related to some
purpose, and the only question is whether the purpose is permissible.
For example, every statute that would have been found violative of
equal protection under the proposed test was rationally (indeed ideally)
related to discriminating against a group that is sufficiently analogous
politically to a racial minority to distrust legislation discriminating
against it. Those statutes were unconstitutional because that purpose
is not permissible. It is the thesis of this article, however, that a discriminatory purpose is the only purpose that is impermissible insofar as
equal protection is concerned.253
To illustrate, consider the following situation: For years, women
had sold flowers on the sidewalk of Franklin Street (the main street in
town) in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. These "flower ladies" were tolerated, indeed appreciated, by the local citizenry. About five years
ago, a substantial number of vendors of leather goods began selling
251. 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
252. Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality,andEqual Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).

253. Of course, other purposes may be impermissible for other reasons, such as first amendment and due process considerations.
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their wares on the Franklin Street sidewalk. Because they added congestion without adding cheerfulness and color for the pedestrians on
the sidewalk, and thus never achieved the flower ladies' popularity, the
Board of Aldermen enacted the following ordinance:
Whereas traffic congestion caused by sidewalk vendors has made the
Franklin Street sidewalk a less pleasant place on which to walk, sidewalk vending on Franklin Street is hereby declared to be a misdemeanor punishable by not more than a one hundred dollar fine,
thirty days in jail, or both. This ordinance shall not apply to those
vendors whose only wares are flowers.2 54
The Supreme Court has taken several different approaches to the
type of equal protection challenge that a frustrated vendor of leather
goods might make against the ordinance. In the 1930's, the Court
would have invalidated the ordinance because there was no evidence
2 55
that flower vendors created less traffic congestion than other vendors.
During the next three decades, the Court would have sustained the ordinance on the ground that, for all the record showed, the aldermen
may have believed that flower vendors, in view of the nature or extent
2 56
of their activities, caused less traffic congestion than other vendors.
Finally, in the 1970's, the Court would have sustained the statute on the
ground that the aldermen could have concluded that flower vendors
made Franklin Street a more pleasant place. 5 7 It is submitted that
none of these approaches is either necessary or desirable to resolve the
equal protection challenge.
Each approach assumes that the legislative body has done something it must justify. The Constitution, however, does not normally
require legislation to be justified; rather, it provides that "[t]he powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."' 258 Traditionally, however, the Court has considered inequality
per se enough to require some justification, however slight.2 59 Under
the proposed test, inequality would not trigger the need for justification
unless the inequality was directed against a group that is sufficiently
254. While the above narrative is basically factual, the ordinance is not a verbatim copy of the
actual ordinance. It is presented in this form to illustrate the problems with the rational basis test.
255. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931).
256. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
257. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
258. U.S. CONST. amend. X.259. See, e.g., cases cited notes 256 & 257 su.pra.
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analogous to a racial minority to distrust a legislative judgment against
it.
The Chapel Hill ordinance, by favoring flower vendors, necessarily discriminated against vendors of other products. At least three possible motivations could explain the aldermen's decision to do this: (1)
they concluded that the "flower ladies" did not contribute to the traffic
congestion to the same extent as the other vendors; (2) they deemed the
presence of the "flower ladies" to be an institution indigenous to
Chapel Hill and therefore worthy of protection even though the "flower
ladies" contributed to the congestion as much as any other vendors; or
(3) the "flower ladies" and their friends could exert enough influence in
the next election to make things uncomfortable for the aldermen who
did not vote to exempt them from the ordinance.
If the aldermen acted from either of the first two motives, the
Court and most commentators would sustain the ordinance.2 6 ° If the
aldermen acted from the third motive, however, some of the most
respected professorial and judicial thought would require invalidation
of the ordinance. Professors Tussman and ten Broek in their seminal
article contended "that legislative submission to political pressure does
not constitute a fair reason for failure to extend the operation of a law
to those similarly situated whom it leaves untouched."2 6 ' Mr. Justice
Jackson was even more emphatic in his concurring opinion in Railway
Exfpress Agency, Inc. v. New York, in which, with his usual facility of
expression, he opined:
I regard it as a salutary doctrine that cities, states and the Federal
Government must exercise their powers so as not to discriminate between their inhabitants except upon some reasonable differentiation
fairly related to the object of regulation. This equality is not merely
abstract justice. The framers of the Constitution knew, and we
should not forget today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require
that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door
to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and
260. For a case that the Court viewed as involving a motive like the first one, see Railway

Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). For a case involving a motive like the
second one, see City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). Professor Gunther would
sustain the legislation on the basis of the first motive only if there was evidence that "flower
ladies" did not contribute to traffic congestion to the same extent as other vendors. He would
sustain the legislation on the basis of the second motive only upon proof that it really was one of
In Search of Evolvthe legislature's motives. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword"
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972).
261. Tussman & ten Broek, The Equal Protection ofthe Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
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choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to
escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if
larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better measure to
assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in
operation.262
Despite the force of these arguments, they should not be accepted.
Although the words "equal protection" are definitionally capable of
precluding all special interest or pressure group legislation, there is
nothing in the history of the amendment to support such a radical altering of the traditional function of a legislature. 263 Pragmatically there
is more to be said against than for such an interpretation, since our
system of government is based on a legislature responsive to an electorate capable of "firing" those legislators who do not satisfy it. For this
reason legislatures, unlike administrative bodies and courts, normally
do not have to justify their actions. 2 "
In regard to the street vending ordinance, the remedy of the
leather goods vendors is to attempt to pressure the aldermen as the
"flower ladies" had done. If they can neither promote enough support
among the citizenry to effectively pressure the aldermen nor convince
the aldermen that justice requires repeal of the ordinance, the meaning
of democracy is that the ordinance remains. It would be different if
leather goods vendors were analogous politically to a racial minority;
then they could contend that the political process could not work for
their group and therefore the equal protection clause should be employed to invalidate the discrimination. So long as the group is not
analogous to a racial minority, however, it should not be able to use
equal protection when persuasion and pressure have either been tried
and failed or not been tried at all.265

262. 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
263. For a view of the traditional functions of a legislature see Choper, The Supreme Court
and the PoliticalBranches: Democratic Theory and Practice, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 810 (1974). See
also Posner, supra note 36.
264. On this point there is disagreement with Professors Gunther, note 260 supra, and Christie, A Model of JudicialReview of Legislation, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1306 (1948), who contend that
the legislatures should be required to justify their actions.
265. One could argue that in fact the leather goods vendors were analogous politically to a
racial minority inasmuch as they tended to be "hippies," whereas the "flower ladies" were fine old
southern ladies. The resolution of this question depends in part on whether a seemingly neutral
statute could be unconstitutional because of a discriminatory effect. Cf. Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976) (validating police qualifying exams that had racially disproportionate impact).
That question is beyond the scope of this article, see note 2 supra. Consequently, throughout the
discussion of the ordinance, it is assumed arguendo that vendors of leather goods differ from
vendors of flowers only in the wares that they sell.
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Occasionally, a classification may be adopted because of inadvertence. For example, assume that one of the "flower ladies" sold a potted flowerless plant on Franklin Street, and since she could not say that
her only wares were flowers, assume that the highest North Carolina
court that would hear the case upheld her conviction for violating the
ordinance.26 6 Should the Supreme Court reverse her conviction on the
ground that excluding plant vendors from the flower proviso was inadvertent and irrational? The proposed test would uphold the conviction. It is not the function of the Court, acting pursuant to the equal
protection clause, to redraft the ordinance in accordance with what it
thinks the aldermen wanted to say. The aldermen can remedy the situation by amending the ordinance to exempt plant vendors, retroactively
if desired,26 and if the aldermen do not so act, the "plant lady" has the
same remedy as any other citizen-political retribution to the extent
she can muster it.
The deficiencies of the rational basis test are apparent from this
analysis of a semi-fictionalized Chapel Hill ordinance.2 6 As a practical
matter, rational basis is virtually a toothless standard in the area27of
0
economic regulations anyway. 269 It is time to formally abandon it.
CONCLUSION

Unlike recent suggestions of multi-tiered equal protection,

the

266. This of course fixes the meaning of the statute. See, e.g., Murdock v. City of Memphis,
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
2767. Cf. Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964) (overturning convictions of blacks
for participating in lunch counter sit-ins based on Civil Rights Act of 1964 passed after the convictions).
268. The real statute was invalidated by the trial judge, whereupon the aldermen enacted an
ordinance proscribing all vending on Franklin Street. The "flower ladies" then moved into a
privately owned alley adjacent to the street. Subsequently, a local bank built an indoor corridor
in the area, into which the "flower ladies" moved, and where they have been happily selling
flowers ever since.
269. In some cases in recent years, the Court has appeared to employ a more potent rational
basis test. See Nowak, Realigning the Standardso/Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited,Neutral, and Permissive Classifications,62 GEo. L. REv. 1071 (1974); Gunther,
supra note 260. These cases have not involved purely economic regulations, however.
270. It is arguable that when a provision is demonstrably arbitrary, even in an economic
setting, the statute should be held violative of due process. See, e.g., McCloskey, Economic Due
Processandthe Supreme Court:,An Exhumation andReburial,1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34. That question is beyond the scope of this article. In some of the cases employing a more potent rational
basis test, the group discriminated against was politically analogous to a racial minority, e.g.,
illegitimates, see text accompanying notes 110-47 supra. Other cases could be decided better on
other grounds. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), discussedin text accompanying
notes 18-23 supra.
271. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Nowak, supra note 269.
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proposed test creates a one-tiered framework. In every equal protection case, the Court would ask a maximum of three questions: (1) Is the
group discriminated against sufficiently analogous politically to a racial
minority to distrust a legislative or administrative decision discriminating against it? (2) If so, is there objective evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose? (3) If so, is that evidence sufficient to render it
probable that the discriminatory effect was merely an incidental adjunct to the legitimate, nondiscriminatory purpose? If the answer to the
first question is "no," there can be no denial of equal protection. If the
answer to that question is "yes," the statute or regulation is presumptively unconstitutional and the second question must be considered. A
"no" answer to the second question means that the presumption of unconstitutionality requires invalidation of the discriminatory enactment;
a "yes" answer triggers the balancing process inherent in the third
question, leaving the burden of justification on the state. The proposed test is uniform, basically straightforward, relatively objective,
reasonably flexible, and, most importantly, fairly attributable to the
Constitution.
272 in which the Court
A cursory analysis of Castaneda v. Partida,
rejected the argument that a governing majority can be trusted not to
discriminate against itself, might suggest an unwillingness on the part
of the Court to adopt that portion of the proposed test that focuses on
whether there are reasons to distrust a legislative or administrative decision to discriminate. However, Castaneda involved a community in
which it was not clear how long the Mexican-Americans, who constituted an overwhelming majority of the citizenry, had had a governing
majority, or how meaningful that majority was.273 Because the Court
seemed concerned that the newly empowered Mexican-American jury
commissioners might tend to favor the generally higher class Anglos
and discriminate against their more downtrodden Mexican-American
brethren,274 it specifically distinguished this case from one in which "a
272. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
273. "Among the evidentiary deficiencies are the lack of any indication of how long the Mexican-Americans have enjoyed 'governing majority' status, the absence of information about the
relative power inherent in the elective offices held by Mexican-Americans, and the uncertain rele-

vance of the general political power to the specific issue in this case." Id. at 1283.
274. Mr. Justice Marshall emphasized this point. Id. at 1284-85 (concurring opinion). The
Court recognized the possibility that "[tihe jury commissioners were from the higher socio-economic classes, and they tended to select prospective jurors from among their peers. Consequently,

the number of Mexican-Americans was disproportionately low, since they were concentrated at
the lower end of the economic scale." Id. at 1278 n.l 1.
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majority is practicing benevolent discrimination in favor of a traditionally disfavored minority." 7 5 Thus, Castaneda would seem to be limited to the situation in which a former "discrete and insular" minority
obtains control of a community and continues inexplicably to discriminate against itself. Because the Court concluded that the discrimination
this case does not cut deeply into the
retains its suspect character,2276
77
essence of the proposed test.
In recent years, the Court has seemed willing to scrutinize discriminatory statutes for evidence of a nondiscriminatory purpose in cases
involving alienage, which is regarded as "suspect,"2 7 8 and illegitimacy,
which is not so regarded.2 79 To be sure, the Court has not always confined itself to "objective evidence,"2 8 nor has it used the standard of
"sufficient to render it probable that the discriminatory effect was
merely an incidental adjunct to the legitimate nondiscriminatory
purpose." However, the Court does appear to be searching for something approximating this standard.
This proposal is not a Ouija board for equal protection questions.
Reasonable people will reach different results under it. Indeed, the
author's application of the test to In re Grffiths led to a different result
than that reached by the Court, even though the Court's approach approximated the proposed test as closely as it ever has. 8 Nevertheless,
since the proposed test focuses on those questions, and only those questions, that ought to be relevant to an equal protection inquiry, it should
be adopted.

275. Id. at 1282 n.20.
276. Castanedadid not involve a question of whether the discrimination was permissible, but
whether there was discrimination at all. Although the question of what constitutes discrimination
is beyond the scope of this article, see note 2 supra, Castanedais nevertheless relevant to the issue
of the circumstances under which discrimination is justified.
277. In view of the division of the Justices in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,
98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978), it is difficult to assess whether the case should be read as rejecting the
proposed test.
278. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), discussed in text accompanying
notes 161-66 supra. But see Foley v. Connelie, 98 S. Ct. 1067 (1978), discussedin text accompanying notes 170-71 supra.
279. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), discussedin text accompanying notes
125-27 supra.
280. Id.
281. 413 U.S. 717 (1973), discussedin text accompanying notes 165-69 supra.

